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My dissertation will seek to explain the voting behavior of judges in state courts of last resort in 
death penalty appeals cases.  To do this, I have constructed a dataset that encompasses all death 
penalty appeals cases in 30 states during the period 2000-2006. The dependent variable in my 
quantitative analyses is the vote rendered by each judge in each case, and can take on two values: 
a vote to uphold the sentence of death, or a vote to reverse or vacate the sentence of death. 
Drawing from the judicial literature, my independent variables will include personal factors, 
institutional factors, and environmental factors.  Personal factors include the gender and race of 
the judge, which the literature suggests are related to differences in judicial behavior.  I will also 
use ideology scores developed by Brace et al. (2000), but only for a subset of cases for which 
those scores are available. Institutional factors include the party identification of the governor at 
the time the judge was appointed or elected, the party identification of the governor at the time 
the case was decided, and the party composition of the state House and Senate at the time the 
case was decided. Environmental factors include the state murder rate, the number of executions 
since 1976, and the number of inmates on death row at the time of the decision. The theoretical 
underpinning of this research is derived from the new institutionalism, which posits that judges’ 
decisions are shaped not only by judicial attitudes and strategic considerations, but by a variety 
of institutional and environmental factors. I hypothesize that the institutional and environmental 
factors previously enumerated will have a significant impact on the voting behavior of state high 
court judges in death penalty appeals.  To test my hypotheses, I will use logistic regression to 
















Chapter 1 is an introduction. In it, I will explain how I chose my topic and will discuss 
major Supreme Court cases and normative arguments about the death penalty.  I will address the 
Supreme Court cases because state high courts are directly influenced by the high Court’s 
rulings. I will discuss the normative arguments about the death penalty in order to explain why 
there are fewer death penalty cases in the United States today than in previous decades. 
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the various models of judicial decision-making, focusing on 
the basic tenets of new institutionalism.  In Chapter 3, (Research Design) I will present my 
theory of judicial decision-making in death penalty cases, and I will explain how I defined and 
measured various concepts in compiling the dataset.  In Chapter 4, I will discuss my findings and 
explain how institutional factors influence judicial decision-making.  Specifically, Chapter 4 will 
examine the impact of the composition of the state legislature and the executive branch on 
judicial decision-making.  Lastly, Chapter 5 will conclude by offering suggestions for future 
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Section 1.1: Research Questions 
 
My research begins by asking general research questions about judicial decision-making 
at the state level.  What are the main factors influencing judicial decision-making in state high 
courts?  How does the political environment influence judicial decision-making in state high 
courts?  Does the interaction with political actors influence judicial decision making?  Do state 
judges exhibit judicial independence?  There are many unanswered questions about the voting 
behavior of state court judges, and this dissertation attempts to provide empirical answers to 
those questions.  Ultimately, I aim to unveil the mysterious decision-making process of state high 
court judges in order to illuminate the judicial decision-making process at the state level, assess 
the level of judicial independence, and comment on implications for democracy.  
I begin my dissertation by recognizing gaps in the literature on judicial politics.  
Numerous studies examine the nature of decision-making in the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
research at the state level is limited.  Although the courts might appear to be similar in their 
decision-making processes, the Supreme Court and state high courts exhibit unique institutional 
and cultural differences.  My research examines the voting behavior of state high court judges in 
death penalty appeals cases, and this will contribute to state courts scholarship.  My main goal in 
this research is to empirically examine the factors that influence the voting behavior of state high 
court judges in deciding death penalty appeals cases.  I ask whether or not state high court judges 
practice judicial independence and explain how state high court judges function within the 
context of our democratic system.      
  
2 
Section 1.2: New Institutionalism as Theoretical Basis 
 
The new institutionalism is an approach to understanding American courts in the larger 
political system.  Supporters of new institutionalism argue that it is not enough to understand the 
law and personal preferences of the judges to explain and predict judicial behavior.  This 
approach is broad and comprehensive in that it “captures a more panoramic picture of the 
judiciary as colored and framed by complex, evolving institutions” instead of focusing solely on 
individual justices to understand judicial voting behavior (Lindquist, 1999, 541).  In studying 
judicial behavior, supporters of new institutionalism argue that it is insufficient to study the law 
and personal preferences to explain voting behavior, and that one needs to study the influence of 
other branches to fully explain judicial behavior.   
According to new institutionalism, judicial decision-making involves numerous factors 
beyond the law, case precedent, and personal preferences of judges.  Supporters of new 
institutionalism agree that judicial decision-making is complicated and multidimensional, and 
that it requires exploration of myriad influences that may emanate from political actors.  From a 
broad perspective, new institutionalists “evaluate the extent to which the Court influences and is 
influenced by broader political, economic, professional, and social forces in the United States” 
(Lindquist, 1999, 541).  In essence, new institutionalism is described as “the analysis of judicial 
politics that stresses the interactive and interdependent nature of judicial decision-making” 
(Epstein and Knight, 2003, 232).  This approach considers the judicial branch as part of the 
entire political system and views the court as “part of broader political processes” (Smith, 1988, 
p.89).  Also, new institutionalism examines judicial behavior by evaluating how “choices are 
structured by the institutional setting in which they are made” (Epstein and Knight, 2000, 626).  
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The new institutionalism is rooted in Robert Dahl’s classic 1957 American Political 
Science Review (APSR) article entitled “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court 
in National Policy Making,” in which Dahl concludes that “the policy views of the judicial 
branch are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
majorities of the United States” (Dahl, 1957, p. 285).  According to Dahl, this is due primarily to 
the process by which justices are nominated and confirmed to the Court.  While his work 
addressed the Supreme Court of the United States, and although there is considerable variation in 
the methods by which state high court justices are selected and retained, there is reason to 
speculate that state court judges are influenced by the partisan character of the governors who 
appoint them. 
As a starting point, governors are likely to appoint judges who reflect their values for the 
same reasons that presidents nominate judges who share their values.  Members of the executive 
branch, at any level, prefer to appoint officials who will carry on their policy agendas, and this 
would clearly explain why they pick judges who share their values.  Even a rudimentary analysis 
of Supreme Court voting patterns would reveal that Republican presidents nominate conservative 
justices and Democratic presidents appoint liberal justices.  For this reason, I operate on the 
assumption that state court judges who are appointed by Republican governors are going to 
exhibit more conservative voting behavior than their counterparts, and Democratic appointees 
will exhibit liberal voting tendencies.  In my dissertation, I will use New Institutionalism as the 
theoretical basis to examine the relationship among state high court judges, governors, and state 
representatives in the context of death penalty cases.  My research question is as follows: To 
what extent do institutional and environmental factors influence judicial voting behavior?  
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Specifically, I will test Dahl’s contention that the judicial branch is never too far out of line with 
national preferences, or those of the ruling regime, on major political issues.  Because mine is a 
state-level study, I will argue that a state’s judicial branch is never very far out of line from the 
state consensus on major political issues.  I will argue that state judges, like federal judges, have 
incentives to respond to the preferences of the chief executive and legislators alike.  In the 
American political system of checks and balances, judges must pay attention to the preferences 
of other political actors to achieve their goals.  In other words, they must learn to compromise 
and to anticipate reactions from members of other branches to accomplish their goals effectively.   
The goal of this research is to examine the role of various factors involved in the judicial 
decision-making process, and this requires a comprehensive approach to the process.  More 
specifically, this dissertation explores how the state high court justices vote in death penalty 
cases and how the composition of the state legislature and governors influence their voting 
behavior.  In order to study judicial behavior, it is imperative to examine institutional rules and 
political environments.  Because new institutionalism is the most comprehensive approach in the 
field of judicial politics, this dissertation utilizes new institutionalism and evaluates the 
institutional, environmental, and personal factors relevant to the state judicial decision making 
process.  The application of new institutionalism is instrumental in accomplishing the goals of 
this dissertation and answering all the research questions mentioned above.               
 
Section 1.3: Research Questions 
 
To explore the relationship between state high court judges and the larger political 
context in which they operate, I pose the following specific research questions: 
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1. To what extent do institutional factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
1a. Does Republican control of the legislative branch result in more conservative voting behavior 
by state high court justices in death penalty cases?  (“Conservative” here means voting to uphold 
the decisions of the lower court and affirming death sentences, while “liberal” refers to voting to 
reverse death sentences). 
1b. Does Republican control of the executive branch result in more conservative voting behavior 
by state high court justices in death penalty cases?  
1c. Does a divided government have influence on voting behavior by state high court justices in 
death penalty cases?  
2. To what extent do environmental factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
2a. Does a higher state murder rate result in more conservative voting behavior by state high 
court justices in death penalty cases? 
2b. Does a higher number of executions in a state result in more conservative voting behavior by 
state high court justices in death penalty cases? 
2c. Does a higher number of death row inmates result in more conservative voting behavior by 
state high court justices in death penalty cases? 
3. To what extent do personal factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
3a. Are minority judges more likely to support defendants in death penalty appeals? 
3b. Are female judges more likely to support defendants in death penalty appeals? 
3c. Are judges who have been on the bench longer more likely to support defendants in death 




Section 1.4: Supreme Court Cases  
 
State high courts are directly influenced by the rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court, and a 
brief overview of Supreme Court cases is essential for understanding death penalty decisions at 
state high courts.  The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the constitutionality of 
the death penalty on numerous occasions.  The power of judicial review gives the Court a unique 
role in interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s relevance to the abolishment of the death penalty in 
America.  The Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment in different ways at different points in 
history.  In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court declared that the death 
penalty, as then administered, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the 
Eighth Amendment.  The Court mentioned that the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary, 
in so much as it affected certain races disproportionately, and was applied differently across 
various types of crimes (Scheb and Scheb, 2010, p.609).    
However, many states gradually reinstated the death penalty in late 1970s after the 
Supreme Court upheld a revised version of the death penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg reinstated the death penalty because 
the Court ruled that a punishment of death does not violate the Eighth Amendment, per se.  This 
ruling was based on the new procedures established to standardize, somewhat, the death 
penalties application.  Under the bifurcated trial system in Georgia, separate proceedings are 
used to establish guilt and punishment.  In order to impose the death penalty upon a defendant 
who has been convicted, the jury has to find aggravating factors listed in the Georgia statute, and 
deem that these factors outweigh any potential mitigating factors (Scheb and Scheb, 2010, 
p.609).   
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Recently, the Supreme Court has refined death penalty laws in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 
304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The former prohibited the imposition of 
the death penalty on mentally ill defendants, while the latter prohibited its imposition on minors 
under the age of 18.  The underlying rationale in these cases dealt with the diminished capacity 
of these groups for understanding the consequences of behavior.  In addition, both cases 
appeared to defer to the feelings of legislative majorities, as both opinions made specific 
references to the number of states that had already acted to protect these groups from capital 
punishment.  Roper even made reference to an international consensus against executing minors.  
Some might have thought that these decisions signaled a trend toward the abolition of the 
death penalty.  However, in April of 2008, the Court announced its ruling in Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35 (2008).  In this case, two inmates in Kentucky brought a constitutional challenge and 
asked the Court whether the use of a four-drug lethal injection violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  In deciding that it does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment, Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court and said, “some risk of pain is 
inherent in any method of execution—no matter how humane—if only from the prospect of error 
in following the required procedure.”  Justice Roberts added that “it is clear that the Constitution 
does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions” 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  
Inherent in this decision, though, was another instance of the Court essentially deferring to state 
legislatures and state law enforcement officials when it comes to the application of the death 
penalty.  This seems to imply that Supreme Court justices minimize the scope of their 
intervention in state matters regarding the death penalty.  This makes analysis of state court 
behavior on this topic a matter of particular interest for scholars.   
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Section 1.5: State Courts and the Death Penalty 
   
Typically courts are divided into three tiers, and cases are tried at district courts, appeals 
are handled by a court of appeals, and state supreme courts are third in the process from a 
sequential standpoint.  In the states of Texas and Oklahoma, court of criminal appeals deals with 
cases involving the death sentence, rather than state supreme courts.  However, in other states, 
state supreme courts are likely to hear death penalty appeals.  As Scheb and Scheb note, “Many 
states provide automatic appeals of death sentences to their highest court” (Scheb and Scheb, 
2010, p.648).  Given the layers involved in the process, it is easy to understand that the judicial 
system is complex. Ultimately, this is to ensure that the judicial system protects the constitutional 
rights of individuals and reduces errors.  As a result, there are a variety of channels and methods 
for challenging a sentence of death.  
Challenging state court convictions is possible through numerous venues such as appeals 
on procedural grounds, state habeas corpus hearings, federal habeas corpus hearings, post-
conviction relief, and clemency by governors.  Habeas corpus provides prisoners with a legal 
remedy and protection “from unlawful confinement” (Scheb and Scheb, 2010, p.717).  In 1996, 
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDP) in an attempt to 
limit the number of subsequent habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners, and the act also 
imposed a one-year time limit to file a petition on prisoners (Freedman, 2001).  Post-conviction 
relief allows prisoners to challenge their convictions after trying other methods of appeals (Scheb 
and Scheb, 2010, p.723).  Defendants in all states are eligible to seek post-conviction relief for 
various reasons: the discovery of new evidence after the trial, ineffective counsel of trial lawyers, 
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false testimony of witnesses, withholding of evidence by the prosecution at trial, violation of due 
process or a fair trial, and any other type of constitutional violation (Bass, 2010).   
The legal process is extremely time-consuming and costly, and it is highly unlikely for a 
case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court.  Because the U. S. Supreme Court only reviews a small 
number of cases annually, state supreme courts become the courts of last resort for many 
criminal defendants who are sentenced to death.  Consequently, state supreme courts play a 
critical role in deciding who will be put to death.  My research focuses on the judicial behavior 
of state supreme court judges in death penalty appeals cases.  My research only analyzes death 
penalty appeals cases and excludes all the other cases.  For instance, my dataset does not include 
post-conviction relief petitions mainly because the nature of the legal question is very different 
from the questions presented in appeals cases.  For instance, whether to hear a petition or not is 
very different from ruling whether the lower court decision is affirmed or reversed.  Herein, I 
examine death penalty appeals cases and recorded judicial votes that indicate whether judges 
affirmed or reversed decisions from lower courts.    
Table 1.1 illustrates numerous death penalty cases, and it shows the intricacy and 
complexity of the death penalty in a nutshell.  Cases are picked from Cornell Law School’s 
topical list under the death penalty.  Since state courts are indirectly influenced by the Supreme 
Court rulings, an illustration of Supreme Court rulings is conducive to understanding state court 
decision-making.  In studying these cases, it is worth paying close attention to the ways in which 





Table 1.1: Death Penalty Cases Considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, 1972-2010 
 
Year Name of the Supreme Court Case 
1972 Furman v. GA 
1976 Gregg v. GA 
1977 Corker v. GA 
1978 Lockett v. OH 
1986 Ford v. Wainwright 
1987 McCleskey v. Kemp 
1988 Thompson v. OK 
1989 Stanford v. Kentucky 
2002 Ring v. AZ 
2002 Atkins v. VA 
2005 Roper v. Simmons 
2006 Kansas v. Marsh 
2006 House v. Bell 
2008 Medellin v. TX 
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2008 Baze v. Rees 
2008 Kennedy v. LA 




Section 1.6: Death Penalty and the Future 
 
At this juncture, I briefly discuss the normative arguments about the death penalty in 
order to lay an ideological foundation for my empirical research findings and to explain why the 
number of executions has decreased in the United States in recent years.  The death penalty is 
concentrated in a few states, and it is unknown what the future holds for the death penalty in 
America.  As of March 2011, 34 states have the death penalty in America while the other 16 
states officially have abolished the death penalty.  For instance, New Jersey and New Mexico 
abolished the death penalty legislatively, and many states unsuccessfully attempted to repeal the 
death penalty recently.  Executions are rare in many states today, and twelve states have 
executed fewer than three people since they reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia 
(1976).     
Opponents argue that death penalty should be abolished because of its inability to deter 
crime.  The general consensus in the research community is that the death penalty does not deter 
crime.  Radelet and Akers did a survey to find out what the leading criminologists thought about 
the impact of the death penalty and its role as a deterrent to crime in America.  Their goal was to 
assess expert opinions on whether the death penalty has a general deterrent effect on criminal 
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homicide (Radelet and Akers, 1996; Radelet and Lacack, 2009).  They surveyed 67 of the 70 
current and former presidents of three professional Criminology Organizations, including the 
American Society of Criminology, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and Law and Society 
Association.  Over 80 percent of these experts indicated in the survey that the existing research 
fails to support a deterrence justification for capital punishment. 
Also, opponents argue that the death penalty should be abolished because people of color 
are impacted disproportionately, although the death penalty is supposed to treat everyone with 
impartiality in order to honor the “equal protection clause” of the 14
th
 Amendment.  It goes 
without saying that it is only fair to apply the law to everyone without being arbitrary or 
discriminatory.  There are numerous research findings indicating that the death penalty affects 
people of color disproportionately.  Race has an impact in the administration of justice, and 
empirical evidence shows that there is a legitimate reason to abolish the death penalty.  Many 
scholars argue, “blacks are indicted, charged, convicted, and sentenced to death in 
disproportionate numbers” (Johnson, 1957; Garfinkel, 1949).  Also, Bowers and Pierce (1984) 
found in their studies that black offenders whose victims are white are punished 
disproportionally.  Ross (1994) found similar evidence in his analysis of 227 executions 
throughout the states, confirming that blacks are impacted by the death penalty 
disproportionately.  “While 86 black or minority prisoners were executed for murdering white 
victims,” noted Ross, “only two white murderers were executed for the death of a non-white” 
(Ross, 1994).  Zeisel found in his research that the likelihood of defendants being sentenced to 
death was influenced by the race of both the victims and the defendants (Zeisel, 1981).  
According to his research, only 24 percent of the white defendants were arrested and sentenced 
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to death for murdering a white victim while forty-seven percent of the black defendants were 
arrested and sentenced to death for murdering a white victim.   
In addition, opponents believe that the death penalty should be abolished because of its 
error rates.  The system is flawed in that innocent people are executed.  Wrongful convictions 
happen for numerous reasons such as false confessions, improper forensic science, eyewitness 
misidentification, and so on.  The administration of capital punishment produces human errors 
just like any other public policy.  But what is disturbing here is that the human errors create 
irreversible outcomes if the society continually executes the innocent and repeats mistakes even 
after recognizing the error.  It is unjust to execute innocent people who do not deserve to be 
executed, and it is irresponsible to acknowledge the pattern and do nothing.  Since 1973, 138 
people have been released from death row after finding sufficient evidence to support their 
innocence.  If innocent people are wrongfully convicted and put to death, we as a nation should 
be embarrassed and deeply concerned.  Table 1.2A and 1.2B illustrate the number of people 
exonerated by year and by state respectively as of October 27, 2010.  In theory, we have a 
system that guarantees due process for all, but in practice, we have a “broken system” that 
executes innocent people in this country (Liebman et al., 2002).  A non-profit organization, 
Death Penalty Focus states in their report that the judicial system of CA has made errors in the 
administration of the death penalty, and that is “intolerable in a society dedicated to the rule of 

















































Source: Death Penalty Information Center (http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death- penalty). 
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Supporters of the death penalty may have lost faith in the rehabilitation of criminals, 
especially repeat offenders.  They may argue that there are criminals who cannot be redeemed 
because they are a drain on society, and the best way to deal with them is to execute them.  
Supporters of the death penalty argue that they believe in the legitimacy of the death penalty and 
justify their belief by arguing that murderers should be punished and executed for retributive 
reasons, and that they deserve to suffer and die since imprisonment for life is not enough to 
punish them (Bedau, 1978; Finckenauer, 1988).  
 
Section 1.7: Decreased Support 
 
Fewer people support the death penalty in recent years according to a national omnibus 
poll done by RT Strategies.  The factors include the execution of innocent people, the lengthy 
appeals process, the high costs of the death penalty, and religion (Dieter, 2007).  In regard to the 
appeals process, the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that the average time from sentencing to 
execution has increased from 10 years in 1996 to 13 years in 2009.   
Also, the decreased numbers of executions indicate that the death penalty is no longer 
accepted in many states.  For example, the death penalty is highly concentrated in seven states: 
Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Ohio.  In his concurring 
opinion in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Justice Breyer acknowledged that half of the 
death penalty cases come from seven states.  The decline of the death penalty might explain why 
some argue that the “state-by-state repeal of the death penalty could spark nationwide repeal” 
(Scherzer, 2009, 257).  Chief Justice Warren noted in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) that the 
Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the “evolving standards of decency that mark 
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the progress of a maturing society.”  Perhaps we are already showing signs of progress at the 
state level, and reduced numbers of executions are the living proof of that.   
My goal is to empirically examine the role of institutional factors in the administration of 
the death penalty.  I aim to evaluate the influence of institutional, environmental, and personal 
factors.  With that in mind, I will study the role of various factors influencing death penalty 
decisions in state high courts.  I intend to find out how institutional factors influence state high 
court judges in their judicial decision making. With the decrease in the number of death penalty 
cases in the U.S., researchers face more challenges in conducting quantitative analyses of voting 
behavior in death penalty appeals cases.  Table 1.3 illustrates the decreased number of the death 
penalty cases in the U.S., and some might speculate that this is a precursor of the abolition of the 
death penalty in the U.S.  The number of executions slowly increased after the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), and the number has dwindled since 1999.  In 2010, 
























































 The dwindling number of executions around the country as a whole, and the specific 
concentration of executions in seven states, serves to highlight the fact that state criminal statutes 
vary in the way they handle crimes eligible for the death penalty.  On the next page, it shows the 
specific crimes punishable by the death penalty in various states, to illustrate diversity and 
variation of state statutes.  As per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008), the death penalty can only be applied to homicide crimes.  The Kennedy case 
specifically overrules a sentence of death for child rape.  Even with this general guideline 
regarding homicide, different states have arrived at specific delineations of the type of homicide 






























Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, State by State 
 
 The Bureau of Justice Statistics lists the following as capital crimes, 
by state as of December 2009: 
Alabama Intentional murder with one of 18 aggravating factors. 
Arizona First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 14 aggravating 
factors. 
Arkansas Capital murder with a finding of at least 1 of 10 aggravating 
circumstances; treason. 
California First-degree murder with special circumstances; sabotage; train 
wrecking causing death; treason; perjury causing execution of an 
innocent person; fatal assault by a prisoner serving a life sentence. 
Colorado First-degree murder with at least 1 of 17 aggravating factors; first-
degree kidnapping resulting in death; treason. 
Connecticut Capital felony with 8 forms of aggravated homicide. 
Delaware First-degree murder with at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance. 
Florida First-degree murder; felony murder; capital drug trafficking; capital 
sexual battery. 
Georgia Murder; kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom when the victim dies; 
aircraft hijacking; treason. 
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Idaho First-degree murder with aggravating factors; first-degree kidnapping; 
perjury resulting in death. 
Illinois First-degree murder with 1 of 21 aggravating circumstances 
Indiana Murder with 16 aggravating circumstances. 
Kansas Capital murder with 8 aggravating circumstances. 
Kentucky Murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating factors. 
Louisiana First-degree murder; treason. 
Maryland First-degree murder.  Can apply to either premeditated murder or 
murder during the commission of a felony. 
Mississippi Capital murder; aircraft piracy  
Missouri First-degree murder. 
Montana Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances. 
Nebraska First-degree murder with a finding of at least 1 aggravating 
circumstance. 
Nevada First-degree murder with at least 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances. 
New 
Hampshire 
Murder committed in the course of rape, kidnapping, or drug crimes; 
killing of a law enforcement officer; murder for hire; murder by an 
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inmate while serving a sentence of life without parole. 
New Mexico First-degree murder with at least 1 of 7 statutorily-defined aggravating 
circumstances. 




Ohio Aggravated murder with at least 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances. 
Oklahoma First-degree murder in conjunction with a finding of at least 1 of 8 
statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances. 
Oregon Aggravated murder. 
Pennsylvania First-degree murder with 18 aggravating circumstances. 
South 
Carolina 
Murder with 1 of 12 aggravating circumstances 
South Dakota First-degree murder with 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances. 
Tennessee First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances. 
Texas Criminal homicide with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances. 
Utah Aggravated murder. 
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Virginia First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances (VA Code 
§ 18.2-31). 
Washington Aggravated first-degree murder. 
Wyoming First-degree murder; murder during the commission of sexual assault, 
sexual abuse of a minor, arson, robbery, escape, resisting arrest, 




Beyond different statutes that can allow for the death penalty, in addition, states also have 
different methods of judicial selection. Table 1.4 displays these methods of selection of state 
high court judges in 50 states.  The method of judicial selection is important because it can 
potentially influence judicial outcomes.  For instance, the gubernatorial appointment system 
grants enormous amount of power to governors in picking judges who share similar values, 
whereas the method of election gives people more influence in picking judges.  Where people 
have power in the process, judges might be required to heed the leanings of public opinion when 
crafting decisions.  Although federal judges are insulated through the grant of life tenure, state 
judges are in fact subject to the whims of the masses—a fact that seems contrary to notions of 
judicial independence.  An aspect of my work will examine whether such a selection method 
does in fact compromise this ideal.   
In short, methods of selection vary by states, and Table 5 illustrates the variation.  
Seventeen states employ merit selection to increase accountability, and this is a method of 
selection that combines both gubernatorial appointment and election.  It involves judges being 
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appointed by a governor, and then facing “retention election” from the people at a later date.  
However, a pure election for appointment to a judgeship remains the most common method of 

























































Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New 





Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, 








Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, 

























Section 1.8: Importance of This Research 
 
As I describe above, this dissertation addresses numerous research questions at the state 
level.  Addressing these questions is important because the ideas of new institutionalism have not 
been put to empirical test at the state level.  Without rigorous empirical testing, no theory can be 
regarded as sound.  This study seeks to contribute to the field of judicial politics by examining 
relationships among state high court judges, governors, and state representatives.  It is unclear 
whether state judges practice judicial independence or whether they defer to the lead of members 
of other branches.  Judicial decision-making is an important aspect of the policy-making process 
in America, and this research addresses many unanswered questions about the voting behavior of 
state high judges.  This will ultimately contribute to our understanding of the judicial branch in 
the administration of justice, and its place in the overall American democratic system.  The 
Founding Fathers envisioned a system that would employ checks and balances and also respect 




















Chapter 2. Models of Judicial Decision Making 
 
 
Section 2.1: Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 will discuss various models of judicial decision-making, while focusing on 
new institutionalism, which is the approach this dissertation is going to take. 
The Supreme Court is an institution that essentially makes public policy by interpreting the 
Constitution and provisions of law (Baum, 2007).  As the guardian of the Constitution, the Court 
“decides major questions of public policy by bringing political controversies within the 
language, structure, and spirit of the Constitution” (O’Brien, 2003, p.369).  Although its 
influence is “usually subtle and indirect,” the Court influences American life profoundly by 
“appealing to the country to respect the substantive value choices of human dignity and self-
governance embedded in the Constitution” (p. 369).  In order to understand the institution of the 
Supreme Court, judicial scholars have tried to solve the puzzle of judicial decision-making with 
different approaches.  Four models of judicial decision-making have contributed to our 
understanding of the Supreme Court—the legal model, the attitudinal model, the strategic model, 
and new institutionalism.  
 
Section 2.2: The Legal Model 
 
Traditional inquiry into the Supreme Court is often termed as the “legal model,” and it 
assumes “judicial votes result from the application of use of professional interpretative 
techniques” (Brisbin, 1996, p.1004).  Haines states that the legal model describes judges as if 
“they were mere instruments of the law” in the way they apply the law (Haines, 1908, 221).  In 
other words, in making judicial decisions, judges “interpret the law rather than create the law” 
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(Wrightsman, 2006, p.111).  According to the legal model, judges do not let their values and 
politics get in the way in the decision-making process.  They simply come to their decisions 
based on the law itself, and their values and views do not influence the process at all.  For this 
reason, one can expect that judicial outcomes will be the same if judges uniformly use the legal 
model (Wrightsman, 2006, p.20).   
To put it broadly, the legal model includes mechanical jurisprudence and more 
sophisticated variants, but they share the assumption that judicial decision-making is “influenced 
by the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of 
the Framers, and precedents” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002, p.48).  Plain meaning holds that “judges 
rest their decisions in significant part on the plain meaning of the pertinent language” (Segal and 
Spaeth, 2002, p.53).  “Framers’ intent” refers to the way judges read the Constitution and 
maintain the original meaning instead of creating new interpretations of the Constitution.  
Precedents are previous legal decisions and rulings that judges use in deciding cases at hand.   
Another depiction arising from the legal model is called mechanical jurisprudence, which 
is the idea that judges make decisions solely based on statutes and case laws (Pound, 1908).  
Under this theory, judges read the law without using extra-legal factors, and it simplifies the 
entire judicial decision-making process.  This approach is technical and deductive, and it led 
Pound to develop his theory of sociological jurisprudence.  Pound stated that the law must be 
stable, but it must not stand still.  He was deeply concerned with practical implications of judicial 
decisions and expressed his skepticism toward mechanical jurisprudence.  He believed that it was 
“quite erroneous for the judiciary as well as the legal profession to entertain the belief that judges 
could find the pre-appointed code pigeonhole for each concrete case, to put the case in hand into 
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it by purely logical process and to formulate the result in a judgment” (Pound, 1922, p.124; 
Becker, 1964, p.45).  According to Pound, the main problem with mechanical jurisprudence is 
that it is “unrealistic and it perpetrates injustice” (Becker, 1964, 46).  He was concerned with the 
notion of justice, and he believed that mechanical jurisprudence was an inadequate approach for 
judges to use when they deal with human relationships.  Without paying attention to the 
situation, simply focusing on the precedent is insufficient to explain human relationships 
(Becker, 1964, p.46).  This is why judges should understand the situation rather than simply 
applying the precedent in order to reach a just decision.  Pound states that “the certainty attained 
by mechanical application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory” (Pound, 
1922, p.141; Becker, 1964, p.46). Justice Benjamin Cardozo also criticized mechanical 
jurisprudence, and his criticism of mechanical jurisprudence comes from the fact that judges only 
take statutes and precedents into account and disregard human factors.  According to Becker, “to 
Cardozo the idea of a simplistic, deductive thought process was a poor joke and a dangerous 
illusion” (Becker, 1964, p.47; Rodell, 1939). In other words, mechanical jurisprudence is too 
simple to be taken seriously.   
In addition, critics of the legal model and mechanical jurisprudence argue that plain 
meaning alone does not explain the outcome of judicial decisions.  Finding “mathematical 
exactness in the use of English” is impossible (Segal and Spaeth, 2002, p.110).  Leo Strauss 
(1959) stresses the importance of finding the intentions of the framers in reading the 
Constitution.  But it is difficult to find the intentions of the framers; some words are naturally 
ambiguous and what it meant before may not apply in today’s standard.  Precedents also fail to 
explain judicial decisions (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  Stare Decisis is a term used to describe 
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judge’s adherence, deference, or respect to precedents.  However, many cases are overturned 
through the appeals process, and stare decisis alone does not explain or predict judicial voting 
outcomes in reality.  If precedent clearly governed, it would be easy to predict case outcomes.  In 
some cases, precedent can be used to support both sides of an argument. 
Traditional public law scholarship like the legal model was dominant prior to the onset of 
behavioralism.  From a methodological standpoint, the traditional approach is normative, 
descriptive, and historical.  Although traditional public law scholars lack scientific and 
methodological rigor, the legal model still makes a contribution to the field of judicial politics by 
providing information on judicial decision-making.  Cross (1997) argues that some cases are 
explained by legal principles alone.  Bailey and Maltzman find in their research that legal factors 
play an important role in Supreme Court decision-making, but the effect of legal variables varies 
across justices (Bailey and Maltzman, 2008, p.369).  
Many scholars argue that the primary contribution of the legal model is that it helps to 
legitimize the Supreme Court.  According to Scheb and Lyons, “The myth of legality holds that 
cases are decided by the application of legal rules formulated and applied through a politically 
and philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning” (Scheb and Lyons, 2000, p. 930).  
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998) also argue that “judges help perpetuate the myth of legality 
among their attentive publics by framing their decisions in legalistic terms” (cited in Scheb et al., 
2000, p. 933).  The legal model legitimizes the judicial decision-making; “the fictive idea of 
principled legality” (Brisbin, 1996) is a crucial source of the Court’s institutional legitimacy 
(Fiscus, 1991). Although the general public subscribes to the legal model, almost all judicial 
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scholars prefer other models of judicial decision-making, largely because the legal model fails to 
present falsifiable hypotheses that can be empirically tested. 
 




 century, judicial scholars studied the Supreme Court by focusing on the 
individuals as their unit of analysis.  The behavioral approach advanced our understanding of the 
Supreme Court by studying the Court quantitatively and scientifically.  According to Segal and 
Spaeth, “The attitudinal model has its genesis in the legal realist movement of the 1920s” (Segal 
and Spaeth, 2002, p. 87).  Legal realism refers to the movement against mechanical 
jurisprudence, and Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank are associated with legal realism, along 
with other legal scholars such as Holmes.  Llewellyn’s views were consistent with Cardozo’s in 
that he remained critical of the formalistic method of judicial interpretation.  Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo criticized mechanical jurisprudence, and his criticism of mechanical jurisprudence 
comes from the fact that judges only take statutes and precedents into account and disregard 
human factors.  “To Cardozo the idea of a simplistic, deductive thought process was a poor joke 
and a dangerous illusion” (Becker, 1964, p. 47; Rodell, 1939).    
Oliver Wendell Holmes is also associated with the legal realism movement and he states 
that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience” (Holmes, 1881, p. 5).  Along 
with John Chipman Gray, he launched an attack on the “theory of what the thought-process of 
the judge should be” (Becker, 1964, p. 43).  His dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 
US 45 (1905) is known as the “point of departure for most of the legal realist discourses against 
the Coke-Blackstone-Beale-Roberts fundamentalism” (Becker, 1964, p.43).  Frank states that the 
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law “deals with human relations in their most complicated aspects” (Frank, 1949, p.6).  He 
emphasized that laws should adapt to changes in the environment, and one should not forget that 
our societal, industrial, and political conditions change over time (Frank, 1949).  Specifically, he 
said, “Situations are bound to occur which were never contemplated when the original rules were 
made” (Frank, 1949, p.7).  Legal realists set the stage for the behavioral movement by 
questioning the formalistic method of judging.  In essence, a sociological jurisprudence was a 
precursor to the attitudinal model in political science.        
The behavioral movement in political science influenced the way judicial scholars 
conducted their research.  “The behavioral movement in judicial studies arose as an effort to link 
the study of courts to a general methodology for political science” (Maveety, 2003, p. 30).  
Instead of focusing on doctrinal analysis of the law, then, behavioral scholars focused on the 
individual judges as a way to understand Supreme Court decision-making, and they conducted 
empirical analysis on judicial voting behavior.  Using quantitative data, behavioral scholars offer 
research that is theory-driven. Moreover, they try to explain and predict (Somit and Tanenhaus, 
1967).  The emphasis in this type of judicial behavior research is “on empirically testable 
theories and generalizing from observable variables” (Epstein and Knight, 2000, p. 637).   
This focus on individual behavior led the paradigm shift in judicial politics.  Pritchett and 
Schubert set the stage for the evolution of the attitudinal model as it was ultimately elucidated by 
Segal and Spaeth. Subsequently, Glendon Schubert “provided a detailed attitudinal model of 
Supreme Court decision making” in three major works (Segal, 2006, p. 80): Quantitative 
Analysis of Judicial Behavior (1959), The Judicial Mind (1965), and The Judicial Mind Revisited 
(1974).  In his quantitative attitudinal study of the courts, Pritchett measured concepts such as 
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attitudes and opinions and studied judicial behavior of judges (Stumpf, 1988).  Schubert believed 
that “case stimuli and values could be ideologically scaled” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002, p. 89 ).  
Schubert conceptualized the Supreme Court and tried to explain voting behavior using judicial 
votes and measuring attitudes (Segal and Spaeth, 2002, p. 89 ).   
Segal and Spaeth created an influential model of judicial decision-making as they 
analyzed the voting behavior of Supreme Court judges.  This model is referred to as the 
“attitudinal model.”  As a starting point, Segal and Spaeth note that “a model is a simplified 
representation of reality and provides a useful handle for understanding the real world” (Segal 
and Spaeth, 2002, p. 45).  Also, a good model explains and predicts the behavior in question and 
does so parsimoniously; models are judged by the degree of usefulness in helping people 
understand certain behavior in question (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  What Segal and Spaeth 
wanted to accomplish with the attitudinal model was to explain and predict the voting behavior 
of Supreme Court justices.  They argue that attitudes of the Supreme Court judges play an 
important role in explaining their voting behavior.  Spaeth defined his central concept, an 
attitude, as “a relatively enduring interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation” (Segal 
and Spaeth, 2002, p. 91).  Justices’ ideological preferences matter greatly in light of the facts of 
the case (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  In other words, there is a linkage between the attitude of the 
justices and their voting behavior.  According to Segal and Spaeth, there are other factors that 
allow the justices to rely on their ideological preferences: “judicial independence, lack of 
aspiration for higher offices, finality of decisions, and docket control” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002, 
p. 92).  In other words, the nature of decision-making on the Supreme Court is relevant to the 
assertion that justices will primarily vote their attitudes.  Later, I will assess constraints on state 
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court justices that may minimize the attitudinal model’s application in those settings (and thereby 
open the door for alternative portrayals). 
The main contribution of the attitudinal model is that it reveals how judges make 
decisions (Canon, 1993).  The attitudinal model is “remarkable in that it is testable, has been 
tested, and is empirically verifiable” (Benesh, 2003, 119).  Some believe that the attitudinal 
model is the most important model in judicial politics because it inspired a great deal of scholarly 
debate and research.  Also, the attitudinal model “permeates virtually all our work on judges and 
courts today by systematically and empirically shattering the myth of mechanical jurisprudence” 
(Lawrence, 1994).  Other scholars have tested the attitudinal model. For example, Segal and 
Cover (1989) found a strong correlation between judges’ attitudes and their voting behavior in 
their empirical analysis of civil liberties cases, and Segal (1995) found something similar in his 
analysis of economic cases of the Supreme Court as well.  The key independent variable was the 
Segal-Cover score, which rates justices from 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal) based on 
analysis of newspaper editorials about the justice before confirmation to the Supreme Court.  The 
fact that this variable is derived from pre-confirmation assessments is critical because it allows 
the Segal-Cover score to be matched with post-confirmation voting behavior without any fear of 
circular reasoning (i.e., using past votes to explain future votes). 
However, many remain critical of the attitudinal model, and assert that the attitudinal 
model cannot fully explain voting behavior.  Clayton and Gillman believe “it is clear there are 
important questions left unanswered by narrowly focusing on how particular justices vote in 
discrete cases and Guttman-type scaling of judicial attitudes” (1999, p.1).  The fundamental 
question is whether or not the model “adds to the explanation of and understanding of decision 
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making; the question is whether the attitudinal model is a model or just a means to predict the 
outcome of Court cases” (Benesh, 2004; cited in Maveety, 2003, p.125).  Merely stating that 
justices use their attitudes does not explain why they use attitudes (Maveety, 2003, p.125).  
Baum (1998) argues that the attitudinal model is solely predictive and fails to explain behavior 
(p.4).  Another problem of the attitudinal model is that it assumes that judges do not change their 
attitudes over time.  
In addition, the attitudinal model fails to provide a complete understanding of the 
Supreme Court because there is empirical evidence that attitudes do not always influence policy 
outcomes.  Despite the differences in ideology, justices sometimes arrive at unanimous 
decisions, and the attitudinal model neither explains nor predicts these unanimous cases 
(Maveety, 2003).  Caldeira (1994) argues that the attitudinal model is too simple, and that the 
role of attitudes is overstated.  Cross (1997) argues that attitudinalists wish to show that attitudes 
matter to judges, but do so “at the cost of valid, reliable, scientific research” (Benesh, 2003, 
p.123).  In addition, “critics argue that using past votes to predict future votes is inherently 
circular” (Benesh, 2003, p.123).  Baum (1994) states that past votes do not “truly tap personal 
policy preferences, and they only demonstrate some behavioral consistency that might be the 
result of any number of stimuli” (cited in Maveety, 2003, p. 125).  Of course, these last two 
criticisms are mitigated by the use of Segal-Cover scores.  And, overall, despite the criticism, the 
attitudinal model contributes to the field of judicial politics by encouraging scholars to consider 
the role of attitudes in judicial decision-making.  
The attitudinal model demystifies the institution and helps the American public 
understand that the Court is an institution filled with individuals who make decisions using both 
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legal and extra-legal factors.  The narrow focus of the attitudinal model with its ability to explain 
and predict judicial decisions, provides a more realistic assessment of the decision-making 
process of the Supreme Court than the legal model.  Judges are the decision-makers in the 
Supreme Court, and it is logical to focus on them as a way of understanding the institution.  It is 
realistic to think that judges are influenced by legal and extra-legal factors.  Therefore, what the 
attitudinal model has done is to focus on individuals, and it provides a realistic picture of 
Supreme Court decision-making.  To understand the Supreme Court, it is crucial to examine both 
legal and extra-legal factors, and to understand the individuals in the Supreme Court who make 
decisions using both legal and extra-legal factors.  The following sections expound upon extra-
legal factors that transcend attitudes. 
 
Section 2.4: The Strategic Model 
 
The strategic model is based on rational choice theory.  The basic assumption of rational 
choice theory is that actors are goal-oriented and they choose from alternatives in order to 
maximize their utility (Riker, 1990, p.172).  Epstein and Knight developed a strategic model of 
judicial decision-making by applying rational choice theory.  In an attempt to understand judicial 
behavior, they argue that judges make choices based on rational thinking; “justices are strategic 
actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the 
preferences of others, of the choices they expect others to make, and of the institutional context 
in which they act” (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p. xiii).  In short, there are three basic assertions in 
the strategic model.  First, justices try to attain their goals.  Second, justices are strategic.  Third, 
institutions structure justices’ interactions (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p.11).   
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In contrast to the attitudinal model the strategic model holds that judges are sophisticated 
voters.  For instance, they decide what to decide and they think about the outcomes of their 
choices.  Judges bargain, and there are numerous opportunities for them to bargain.  For instance, 
they grant certiorari, vote at conference, write the opinions, get support, and decide to join, 
concur, or dissent with final votes.  As a result, the influence of colleagues on the Court is 
relevant to the strategic approach. 
Beyond that, the unique argument of the strategic model is that the institutional structure 
of the government radically shapes judges’ ability to reach decisions.  “The institution of the 
American separation of powers system serves as a constraint on justices acting on their personal 
preferences” (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p.150).  The institutional context they are in allows 
judges to become strategic actors.  By institutions, Epstein and Knight refer to “sets of rules that 
structure social interactions in particular ways.”  They include formal laws and informal norms 
and conventions (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p.17).  “The institution of life tenure also influences 
justices’ goals.”  They can afford to maximize policy instead of maximizing their chance of 
reelection (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p.17).   
Although Epstein’s strategic model is the most influential model that applies rational 
choice theory to the field of judicial politics, other scholars also use the strategic model.  For 
example, Prichett (1942) argues that judges are politicians with policy goals.  Marks (1988) 
formulated the separation of power model, and he claims that the institution of separation of 
power imposes constraints on the Court.  Many scholars have looked for empirical evidence to 
study the interaction of different branches using the strategic model.  Gely and Spiller (1990) and 
Eskridge and Frejohn (1992) found empirical evidence that supports their claim that justices 
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understand the policy preferences of Congress and respond accordingly.  Eskridge (1991) argues 
that justices are likely to vote their sincere preferences if they assume that Congress is unlikely to 
override their actions.  In terms of intra-Court influences, Rohde presents data “that show that 
justices ideologically closest to the opinion writer and the pivotal justice were favored in opinion 
assignment” (Saul, 2006).  
Critics argue that the strategic model fails to provide complete understanding of the 
Supreme Court.  The main criticism is that it is based on unrealistic assumptions. Segal and 
Spaeth say it is unrealistic to assume that justices have the perfect and complete information 
about the preferences of Congress and other actors.  Others argue that judges do not need to 
worry about congressional action since Congress rarely overturns Supreme Court cases.  Despite 
criticism of the strategic model, it is widely accepted.  Bailey (2007) measures the preferences of 
all political actors in three institutions and quantitatively measures how strategic their behavior is 
over time.  Bailey’s contribution to the field is to “provide a method and data for producing 
preference estimates that are comparable across time and institutions” (Bailey, 2007, p. 447). 
The strategic model helps both scholars and the American public understands the Court 
in terms of its political environment.  It provides a more realistic assessment of the institution 
compared to the legal model and the attitudinal model.  Without understanding the political 
environment of Supreme Court Judges, it is virtually impossible to understand the Court as an 
institution.  The Supreme Court does not have enforcement power, and judges have to rely on 
other branches to enforce their decisions.  For this reason, Supreme Court justices have 




Section 2.5: New Institutionalism 
 
New Institutionalism is a comprehensive approach to the study of judicial decision-
making. It considers numerous factors in examining the judicial decision-making process.  New 
Institutionalism “takes seriously the effects on judicial decision making of judicial norms and 
legal traditions and also attempts to situate the Court in larger political and social contexts” 
(Clayton and Gillman, 1999, p. 4).  New Institutionalists are unique in that they “examine 
political influences over law and judicial behavior” (Corwin, 2006, p. 308).  New Institutionalists 
study how institutional arrangements and relationships shape political behavior (Clayton and 
Gillman, 1999).  This marks a departure from the previous approaches.  The New Institutional 
approach differs from that of the behavioralists mainly because behavioralists focus on 
individual voting behavior and study judges’ motives without considering the political 
environment in which judges operate.  The New Institutionalism approach differs from strategic 
models of decision-making in that the former analyzes voting behavior of justices relative to 
political conditions in the other branches and has tended to focus more on the Court as a whole; 
the latter incorporates the voting behavior of justices relative to the influences of colleagues, and 
has tended to focus more on the behavior of justices as individuals (Sharma, 2009).  It may be 
the case that future New Institutionalist literature will in fact trend more toward an analysis of 
individual justices (Sharma, 2009). 
New Institutionalism is more broad and inclusive than other approaches to the study of 
judicial decision-making in that it encompasses a variety of extra-Court influences.  The 
supporters of New Institutionalism believe that numerous factors such as public opinion and 
interest groups affect judicial decision-making.  With this approach, social scientists explore the 
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role of the Supreme Court and “the full range of judicial politics” and understand “how the Court 
maintains and disrupts major political, social, and economic structures and processes.”  This 
requires more complicated explanations than simply explaining how individual judges promote 
their preferences (Clayton and Gillman, 1999, p. 2).  However, it is important to note that New 
Institutionalism does not completely deny other models of judicial decision-making (Sharma, 
2009).  The basic assumption of New Institutionalism is that judges are strategic, and it shares a 
common ground with the strategic model in this regard.  
New Institutionalists contributed to the field of judicial politics by “understanding the 
institution of courts in the larger political system” (Kritcher, 2006, p. 387).    Although it sounds 
similar to rational choice theory, New Institutionalism encompasses more than the rational 
choice theory (Epstein and Knight, 1998).  New Institutionalism refers to “the analysis of judicial 
politics that stresses the interactive and independent nature of judicial decision-making” (Epstein 
and Knight, 2003, p. 232).  Smith defines New Institutionalism as “the analysis of courts as part 
of broader political processes” (Rogers Smith, 1988, p. 89).  Epstein and Knight state that New 
Institutionalism explores how “choices are structured by the institutional setting in which they 
are made” (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p. 26).   
Epstein and Knight argue that “the word institutions refer to things that structure social 
interactions in particular ways” (1998, p. 17).  It is plausible to assume that justices modify their 
behavior since they face negative consequences when they uncompromisingly pursue their 
preferred policies without foreseeing potential reactions from members of other branches 
(Epstein and Knight, 1998, p. 82).  For instance, justices could face noncompliance with their 
rulings, and Congress can engage in retaliatory actions.  Also, Congress can change the Court’s 
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jurisdiction, keep judicial salaries constant, and impeach justices (Epstein and Knight, 1998, p. 
82).  Murphy argues that justices are willing to modulate their policy preferences to avoid 
extreme reaction from Congress and the President (Epstein and Knight, 2003, p. 204).  Martin 
argues that justices should anticipate reactions to their decisions by the “political branches of 
government” if they want to achieve their preferred policies (Martin, 2006, p. 4).  And, that 
explains why judicial scholars argue that attitudinal theory is incomplete in explaining and 
predicting judicial behavior.  The hope is that New Institutionalists can answer certain questions 
that attitudinalists cannot.  
Critics argue that New Institutionalism itself is incomplete.  First, critics argue that it is 
difficult for justices to foresee the future actions of the Congress and the President (Sharma, 
2009; Segal, 1999, p. 240; Maltzman et al., 1999, p. 50).  Also, critics argue that “strategic 
behavior may not always be discernible in final votes, but may occur in certiorari votes or in 
bargaining for opinion control” (Maltzman et al., 1999, p. 50; Sharma, 2009).     
 
Section 2.6: Those Who Paved the Way Toward New Institutionalism  
 
New Institutionalists study the Court by looking at “what made the Court a political 
institution within the American scheme of governance” (Kritzer, 2006, p. 388- 390).  New 
Institutionalism is a flexible and holistic approach that allows judicial scholars to examine 
numerous variables. New Institutionalism goes beyond the examination of the law and stretches 
all the way to the examination of all the possible factors in judicial decision-making.   
There are many who have paved the way through their works in the field.  Among them, 
Cushman’s early works on the courts are crucial.  Cushman wrote, “The Supreme Court does not 
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do its work in a vacuum; its decisions on important constitutional questions can be understood in 
their full significance only when viewed against the background of history, politics, economics, 
and personality surrounding them and out of which they grew (Cushman, 1925, iii).  He was 
cognizant of the fact that judges are influenced by a variety of factors in their decision making.   
Old institutionalists paved the way for the development of New Institutionalism.  While 
earlier institutionalists “tended to focus on formal structures such as judicial doctrines or 
constitutional provisions, New Institutionalists may be more inclined to emphasize the role of 
informal norms, myths, and background patterns of social meaning, such as religion, class, race, 
and gender” (Smith, 1995; Gillman, 1999, p. 308).  Old institutionalists recognized the difficulty 
of doing the scientific research, but new institutionalists analyzed judicial behavior empirically; 
there lies the key difference between the two types of institutionalists (Sharma, 2009, p. 70).  
Corwin, an old institutionalist, mentioned that it is extremely difficult to conduct empirical 
research on judicial behavior (Clayton, 2006, p. 307).  Subsequently, Corwin argues that there is 
a connection between the old and new institutioanlists: “what unifies the new and old 
institutionalisms is a belief that political science ought to care deeply about the real political 
world of which it is part and that it must therefore remain a normative and a telic science” 
(Corwin, 2006, p. 309).   
Mason also paved the way for the development of New Institutionalism by 
exploring “the connection between the Courts and the other institutions of the federal 
government” and that is why Davis suggests that Mason contributed to the foundation of the 
New Institutionalism (Davis, 2006, p. 319).  McCloskey’s contribution to the development of 
New Institutionalism is crucial, and Murphy “provided an outstanding summary of the sorts of 
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considerations that McCloskey believed to be central to the art of judicial governance” 
(McCloskey, 1964; McCloskey, 2006, p. 347).  McCloskey believed that the “Court, like all 
institutions, had to be mindful of the political system’s general expectations about what a 
legitimate exercise of power looks like, and this required the Court to find a role in the political 
system that was more or less in tune with popular opinion or the preferences of powerful 
constituencies” (McCloskey, 2006, p. 345).  McCloskey and Levinson suggested that the “Court 
learned to be a political institution and to behave accordingly” (McCloskey and Levinson, 2000, 
p. 231), and they emphasized the point that judges have institutional limits and challenges in 
their political environment.  This means that judges are strategic in their decision-making process 
as a result of certain constraints on their ability to individually affect policy outcomes.  
Specifically, they note that:  
 Judges had begun to learn the arts of judicial governance: the necessity 
  to avoid, if possible, head-on collisions with the dominant political forces 
  of the moment; the undesirability of claiming too much too soon; the great 
  advantage of taking the long view, especially when others take the short; 
  the usefulness of identifying judicial claims to authority with the claims of 
  the Constitution (McCloskey and Levinson, 2000, p.34). 
 
Shapiro stated that McCloskey’s approach to studying the Court was “fundamentally historical 
but also acutely sensitive to the situation of the decision-makers at the time they had to make 
their decision” (McCloskey 1972, p. viii, cited in McCloskey, 2006, p. 354). 
In addition, Dahl (1957) paved the way for the development of New Institutionalism 
through his analysis of the Court as an institution that was connected to democratic processes.  
Analyzing the Court as an institution distinguished him from other behavioralists who examined 
individual votes of judges (Adamany and Meinhold, 2006, p. 363).  Adamany and Meinhold 
claim that Dahl chose the Court itself as the unit of analysis because Dahl “believed that judicial 
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policies were shaped by the Court’s interactions with other institutions” (2006, p. 364).  Dahl 
suggested that the Court is part of the dominant national political coalition, and the Court’s 
policies are “consistent with majority will as reflected in the dominant political alliance” 
(Adamany and Meinhold, 2003, p. 364).  Dahl adds that the only time when the Court has a 
major influence in shaping policies is “when the coalition is unstable with respect to certain key 
policies…. The Court can intervene in such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy” 
(Dahl, 1957, p. 294). 
 Shapiro also paved the way for the New Institutionalists by examining the relationship 
between the Supreme Court and other actors (Kritcher, 2006).  Kritcher argues that Shapiro’s 
work “serves as a bridge between traditional institutional analysis of the judicial branch and the 
work of the New Institutinalists” (Shapiro, 2006, p. 387).  His contribution is three-fold: 
understanding courts and court processes as institutions; understanding the institution of courts in 
the larger political system; understanding the institutional function of judicial norms (Shapiro, p. 
387).  Shapiro’s institutional approach was different from that of his predecessors mainly 
because he saw courts as political institutions instead of legal institutions (Kritcher, 2006, p. 
390).  He viewed courts as institutions “intimately involved in creating, shaping, and interpreting 
policy,” and “wanted to compare courts to other institutions in this broadly defined political 
process” (Kritcher, 2006, p. 390). 
In summary, various models of judicial decision-making explain judicial behavior.  New 
Institutionalism is the approach this dissertation is going to utilize, primarily because it is the 
most comprehensive approach.  New Institutionalism frames my research questions 
appropriately.  My intention in this dissertation is to examine the role of the state courts in the 
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American political system and to examine the judicial branch in relation to members of other 
branches. New Institutionalism is the most appropriate approach due to its comprehensiveness 
and inclusiveness. I find it important to examine the judicial branch in relation to members of 


































Chapter 3. Research Design 
 
In Chapter 3, I will present my theory of judicial decision-making in death penalty cases 
and explain how I defined and measured various concepts and compiled the dataset. 
Section 3.1: Research Questions 
  
To explore the relationship between state high court judges and the larger political 
context in which they operate, I pose the following specific research questions: 
1. Do institutional factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
●1a. Does Republican control of the legislative branch at the time of a decision result in more 
conservative voting behavior by state high court justices in death penalty cases?  “Conservative” 
here means voting to uphold the decisions of the lower court and affirming death sentences, 
while “liberal” refers to voting to reverse death sentences from lower courts. 
●1b. Does Republican control of the executive branch at the time a decision is reached, or at the 
time of appointment, result in more conservative voting behavior by state high court justices in 
death penalty cases?  
●1c. Does divided party government moderate voting behavior by state high court justices in 
death penalty cases? 
2. Do environmental factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
●2a. Does a higher state murder rate result in more conservative voting behavior by state high 
court justices in death penalty cases? 
●2b. Does a higher number of executions in the state result in more conservative voting behavior 
by state high court justices in death penalty cases? 
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●2c. Does a higher number of death row inmate result in more conservative voting behavior by 
state high court justices in death penalty cases? 
3. Do personal factors matter in judicial decision-making? 
●3a. Are minority judges more likely to support defendants in death penalty appeals? 
●3b. Are female judges more likely to support defendants in death penalty appeals? 
●3c. Are judges who have been on the bench longer more likely to support defendants in death 
penalty appeals?   
 
Section 3.2: The Model 
 
In this study, my dependent variable is Outcome.  This variable takes a value of 0 if an 
individual justice votes to uphold a defendant’s death sentence, and a value of 1 if the justice 
votes to reverse the death sentence.  My independent variables fall into three categories: (1) 
institutional variables; and (2) environmental variables; (3) personal variables.     
Section 3.2.i: Institutional Factors 
This study examines the effect of institutional factors on the behavior of state judges. To 
determine the effects of institutional factors, I include several institutional variables in my 
statistical analyses. I include a variable called RepGov to capture the party of the appointing 
governor, largely because research indicates that the party identification of the appointing 
President influences the voting behavior of high court justices (see below).  Herein, the party of 
the appointing governor is coded 1 for Republican governors and 0 otherwise.  Many judicial 
scholars have found that presidents pick “judges who share their political preferences at the 
federal level, and those judicial preferences are then translated into votes” (Songer and Ginn, 
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2002, p. 301; Carp and Rowland, 1983; Gottschall, 1986; Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 2000).  
Supreme Court scholars have found that judicial votes reflect the preferences of the presidents 
who appoint them (Richardson and Vines, 1970; Goldman, 1975; Howard, 1981; Carp and 
Rowland, 1983; Gottschall, 1986; Songer and Davis, 1990; Haire, 1993; Rowland and Carp, 
1996; Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 2000).  This explains why Presidents tend to appoint federal 
judges of their own party (Goldman, 1981; 1991; 1997).  In addition, in 90 percent of all cases, 
presidents have appointed judges who share the same party in federal courts (Songer and Ginn, 
2002). For these reasons, in assuming that a similar trend will manifest itself among executives 
at the state level, I include RepGov in this model.  I expect this variable to be positively 
associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
Another variable called Govnr is also included in the model.  It indicates the party of the 
governor at the time of the judicial decision, and it is coded 1 for Republican governors and 0 
otherwise.  New institutionalist scholars have found that the political party in control at the time 
of a decision is an important factor in explaining judicial voting behavior (Marks, 1988; Spiller 
and Gely, 1992).  In my model, I expect Govnr to be positively associated with the probability of 
a vote to uphold a death sentence. 
I also consider the partisan composition of the state legislature at the time a case is 
decided.  Specifically, I create a variable called House, which is coded 1 if Republicans control 
the state house, and 0 if Democrats control the state house. I also include a variable called 
Senate, which is coded the same way.  I also create a variable called UniRep. This variable is 
coded 1 if Republicans control the entire state legislature as well as the executive office, and 0 
otherwise.  UniDemo is a similar variable, which is coded 1 if Democrats control the entire state 
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government and 0 otherwise.  I include these variables because Richardson and Scheb (1993) 
and Sharma (2009) found that the behavior of Supreme Court justices who are appointed during 
divided government is more moderate than that of those who are appointed during unified 
government.  Also, De Figueiredo and Tiller (1996) find that the likelihood of passing judicial 
expansion legislation is higher when one party controls both legislative and executive branch.  
Consistent with the previous research findings on divided government, I expect UniRep to be 
positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.  I expect 
UniDemo to be negatively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
 
Section 3.2.ii: Environmental Factors  
This study also considers the effects of several environmental factors.  To explore the 
effects of the number of death row inmates in a state, I create a variable called CurrentNum, 
which counts a state’s death row population in 2009.  I also create a variable that accounts for the 
number of executions since 1976, called numb1976.  The number of executions is collected in 
2009 and it varies greatly from state to state.  I include this variable in keeping with the work of 
Hall (1995), which finds that a state’s murder rate is associated with its citizens’ level of support 
for the death penalty.  She adds that justices in states with higher murder rates are more likely to 
uphold death sentences.  In states with high crime rates, it seems as though citizens demand that 
judges be punitive, especially in states where judges are elected by the people.  Consequently, 
judges have incentives to reflect public preferences and become more punitive in their voting 
behavior in these settings.  For example, Gordon and Huber (2002) found that trial court judges 
in Pennsylvania become more punitive as reelection approaches; this indicates that the 
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environment affects judges and their decision-making.  Consistent with previous research 
findings, I expect both CurrentNum and numb1976 to be positively associated with the 
probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
Section 3.2.iii: Personal Variables: Race, Gender, and Length of Time     
Personal variables include race, gender, and length of time on bench.  The variable race 
is coded 1 if a judge is Caucasian, and 0 otherwise.  The variable gender is coded 1 if the judge 
is male, and 0 if the judge is female.  Length of time on bench is a continuous variable indicative 
of how many years a judge has served on the bench.  Most of the judges come to the courts of 
last resort from lower courts in their state, but I simply counted the number of years after the 
judge joins the court of last resort.  
 
Section 3.2.iii.a: Race  
Why do I consider the effects of these variables? I will begin with race. Some scholars 
argue that the race of the justice is an important factor in explaining judicial voting behavior.  
Cook (1973), for example, speculates that the race of the judge may be influential, especially in 
cases involving minority defendants.  Steffensmeier and Britt (2001) found that black judges 
were more likely than white judges to sentence both black offenders and white offenders to 
prison.  Similarly, Gottschall (1983) found that black judges voted more frequently in support of 
criminal defendants in both prisoners’ rights cases and criminal defendants’ rights cases, 
although there was no major difference in their voting behavior in race and sex discrimination 
cases.  Because the race of the judge influences his/her voting behavior, many scholars argue that 
an increase in the number of black judges may result in more equitable treatment of black and 
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white defendants and may have a positive influence in the criminal justice system (Crockett, 
1984; Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, 1988; Mann, 1993).    
In contrast, some scholars argue that the race of the judge does not influence judicial 
voting behavior.  Walker and Barrow (1985), for example, found no racial differences in the 
voting behavior of federal district court judges in criminal cases.  Similarly, Segal (2000) and 
Uhlman (1978) conclude that race does not influence sentencing behavior.  In all, the findings on 
the effects of race are mixed.  Some scholars conclude that race matters while others find that it 
does not.  I include race in my statistical models to explore the effects of race on judicial 
decision-making.  
 
Section 3.2.iii.b: Gender 
I turn next to gender.  Some scholars argue that gender plays an important role in judicial 
decision-making.  Several studies suggest that female judges exhibit certain characteristics in 
decision-making.  Boyd (2006), for example, studied personal injury and civil rights cases and 
found that female justices in the U.S. District Court settle cases more frequently than male 
justices.  Massie et al. (2002) found that female justices in the federal appellate court vote more 
conservatively in criminal cases, but more liberally in civil rights and liberties cases.  In addition, 
Steffensmeier and Herbert (1999) found that female state judges are more likely to incarcerate a 
defendant and tend to give longer sentences than male judges in criminal cases.  Also, McCall 
(2005) suggested that female state high court justices tend to decide police brutality cases more 
liberally than male justices.  Crowe (1999) even examined race discrimination cases in U.S. 
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District courts and found that female judges were more likely than male judges to support 
plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases.    
However, some scholars argue that gender has no impact on judicial decision-making 
(Segal, 2000; Martin, 1993; Gryski et al., 1986, Allen and Wall, 1987).  Segal (2000) found no 
statistically significant gender effect, and concluded that President Clinton’s district court 
appointees did not provide policy representation to female constituents.  Although Clinton made 
an effort to appoint more female justices to the federal judiciary, symbolic representation (merely 
have a characteristic represented) did not lead to active representation (votes to favor a certain 
demographic).  Several other studies found no support for the notion that gender affects judicial 
decision-making (Songer, Davis, and Haire, 1994; Cameron and Cummings, 2003; Manning, 
2004; Kulik, Perry, and Pepper, 2003; Martinek, 2003; Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab, 
1995; Songer et al., 1994; Davis, 1993; O’Connor and Segal, 1990; Kritzer and Uhlman, 1977; 
Songer and Crew-Meyer, 2000; Martin and Pyle, 2000; Garrison, 1995; Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 
1998; Westergren, 2004).  In crafting this variable, I coded 1 for male judges and 0 otherwise.  I 
include the variable gender in my statistical models to explore the role of gender in judicial 
decision-making.  
 
Section 3.2.iii.c: Time on the Bench 
 
Judicial scholars have coined the term “freshmen effect” to explain the behavior of newly 
appointed Supreme Court justices (Scheb and Ailshie, 1985).  Brenner (1983) studied voting 
behavior of Supreme Court justices from 1946 to 1977 and compared voting behavior of new 
justices and experienced justices.  He hypothesized that freshmen justices have a moderate 
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voting behavior, but his data did not support the hypothesis.  However, Hagle (1993) finds 
evidence of freshmen effect in his research.  He argues that voting behavior of justices is unique 
when they are new to the Supreme Court.  New justices exhibit “an initial bewilderment or 
disorientation” in their early years (Hagle, 1993, p. 1142).  Also, new justices are far less likely 
to write an opinion of the Court than the experienced justices, and they tend to vote as a 
moderate (Hagle, 1993, p. 1142).  In addition, Snyder (1957) argues that new justices come to 
the Court and tend to form a moderate voting block in their early years.   
According to the freshman effect hypothesis, new Supreme Court justices are less likely 
than experienced justices to produce dissenting opinions.  More specific to my research, Hall 
(1995) found that term length is associated with support for the death penalty, and justices with 
shorter terms are more likely to uphold death sentences (1995).  It is plausible to assume that the 
length of time on the bench affects justices’ voting behavior.  For instance, justices may feel 
somewhat intimidated in their first year on the bench, and they tend to go along with the majority 
and uphold the sentence of death instead of reversing death sentences and writing dissenting 
opinions separately (Hall, 1995).  Justices may develop a sense of security in their position and 
feel less constrained by various other factors as time progresses.  Hurwitz and Stefko (2004) note 
such an increase in independent behavior with each term served on the Supreme Court.  
However, Steffensmeier and Britt (2001) examine the sentencing behavior of Pennsylvania state 
judges and indicate that time on the bench is not statistically significant in their voting behavior. 
I include the variable length of time on bench in my statistical models to explore the effects of 
“the freshman effect” at the state court level.  It is coded numerically.  For instance, it is coded 1 
for 1 year and 20 for 20 years to reflect the number of years served on the bench for each judge. 
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Section 3.3: Hypotheses 
 
My hypotheses are borne out of my specific research questions mentioned earlier in the 
introduction.  They are categorized into three subsections, and there are institutional factors, 
environmental factors, and personal factors.  I test a number of hypotheses in my dissertation, 
and they are as follows: 
Section 3.3.i: Institutional Factors 
 
H1: Judges who are selected during times of Republican control of the executive branch are 
more likely to uphold the sentence of death than judges who are selected during times of 
Democratic control of the executive branch.  In short, control of the executive office by a 
Republican governor at the time of the judicial selection is positively associated with the 
probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
H2: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when a Republican is in control of the 
executive branch at the time of a decision than when a Democrat is in control of the executive 
branch.  In short, Republican control of the executive branch is positively associated with the 
probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
H3: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when the lower chamber of the state 
legislature is controlled by the Republican Party.  In short, control of the lower chamber of the 
legislature by the Republican Party is positively associated with the probability of a vote to 
uphold a death sentence.   
H4: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when the upper chamber of the state 
legislature is controlled by the Republican Party.  In short, the control of the upper house of the 
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legislature by the Republican party is positively associated with the probability of a vote to 
uphold a death sentence.   
H5: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when they are faced with unified 
Republican control of state government.  In short, unified Republican control of state 
government is positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
H6: Judges are more likely to reverse the sentence of death when they are faced with unified 
Democratic control of state government.  In short, unified Democratic control of state 
government is positively associated with the probability of a vote to reverse a death sentence.   
 
Section 3.3.ii: Environmental Factors 
 
H7: Judges in states with higher numbers of death row inmates are more likely to uphold the 
sentence of death.  In short, the number of death row inmates in a state is positively associated 
with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
H8: Judges in states with higher number of executions (since 1976) are more likely to uphold the 
sentence of death.  In short, the number of executions in a state is positively associated with the 
probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
Section 3.3.iii: Personal Factors 
 
H9: Male judges are more likely than female judges to uphold the sentence of death.  In short, 
being male is positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
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H10: Caucasian judges are more likely than non-Caucasian judges to uphold the sentence of 
death.  In short, being Caucasian is positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold 
a death sentence.   
H11: Judges who have served longer on the bench are more likely to uphold the sentence of 
death.  In short, there is a positive relationship between length of time on the bench and the 
probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.   
In testing these hypotheses, I examine three sets of factors purported to affect judicial 
decision-making: institutional, environmental, and personal factors.  Through this research, I will 
be able to find out which factors have statistically significant effects on judicial decision-making 
in death penalty appeals.  I am most interested in seeing the effects of the institutional variables 
on judicial decision-making.  Ultimately, testing these hypotheses will enhance our 
understanding of how institutional factors influence the judicial decision-making process at the 
state level. 
 
Section 3.4: Data and Methods 
 
The main research question of this dissertation is as follows: Do institutional factors 
influence the voting behavior of state high court judges in death penalty cases?  I address this 
question using data from 30 state high courts that operate in states that employ the death penalty.  
My dissertation will seek to explain the voting behavior of judges in state courts of last resort in 
death penalty appeals cases.  To do this, I have constructed a dataset that encompasses all death 
penalty appeals cases in 30 states during the period of 2000-2006.  The dependent variable in my 
quantitative analyses will be the vote rendered by each judge in each case, which can take on two 
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values: a vote to uphold the sentence of death, or a vote to reverse or vacate the sentence of 
death.  I collected data on death penalty cases using legal search engines, including Lexis Nexis 
and Westlaw.  I will test notions gleaned from the New Institutionalist approach to explain 
judicial decision-making, as well as some gleaned from other perspectives.  The unit of analysis 
is the vote of a justice on a given case.   
I have compiled death penalty cases from all states between 2000 and 2006, and my 
dataset allows me to determine what factors are associated with judicial decisions to either 
uphold or reverse death sentences in state courts of last resort.  I relied heavily on Westlaw and 
Lexis/Nexis, and they are the primary legal search engines in collecting death penalty case data 
in my dissertation.  Using Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis, I typed “capital punishment and death 
penalty” in the search engine box and gathered data from all the cases from courts of last resort 
in 30 states.  Defendants convicted of first-degree murder get to appeal to the highest court in 
each state, and the court of last resort is usually the state supreme court.  When cases reach the 
state court of last resort, state judges get to decide whether to uphold or reverse the sentence of 
death from the lower court.  Judges either decide to uphold or reverse the sentence of death, and I 
record it 1 for affirmed decisions and 0 for reversed decisions.  Only 20 percent of the time, the 
entire court reversed the sentence of death from the lower courts, and upholding the sentence of 
death seems to be the norm according to my data.  Between 2000 and 2006, most states had very 
few cases, and the majority of my death penalty cases came from states in the South.   
It is well documented that the death penalty is highly concentrated in seven states: Texas, 
Virginia, Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Ohio, and my dataset reflects this 
fact.  All defendants who appealed their death sentences are included in the dataset between 2000 
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and 2006, and judicial decisions from the courts of last resorts are analyzed in this dissertation.  
The theoretical underpinning of this research is the new institutionalism, which posits that 
judges’ decisions are shaped not only by judicial attitudes and strategic considerations, but also 
by a variety of institutional and environmental factors.  I collect data to test my hypotheses that 
the institutional and environmental factors previously enumerated will have a significant impact 
on the voting behavior of state high court judges in death penalty appeals.   
 
Section 3.5: Three Sets of Factors 
 
Drawing on the judicial literature, my independent variables reflect institutional factors, 
environmental factors, and personal factors that affect judicial decisions.  Institutional factors in 
my dataset include the party identification of the governor at the time the judge was appointed or 
elected, the party identification of the governor at the time the case was decided, and the party 
composition of the state House and Senate at the time the case was decided.  The data on 
institutional factors come from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The composition of state legislatures by 
political party affiliation is recorded year by year, and the presence of divided/unified 
government is coded based on the number of Republicans/Democrats in a given year.   
Among the environmental factors considered in my dataset are the state murder rate, the 
number of executions since 1976, and the number of inmates on death row at the time of the 
decision.  The data on environmental factors are available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
through the U.S. Department of Justice and FBI crime data.  I also relied on a non-profit research 
institution called the Death Penalty Information Center in gathering state-by-state information on 
the number of death row inmates and number of executions.   
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Personal factors in my dataset include the gender and race of the judge, which the 
literature suggests are related to differences in judicial behavior.  I will also use ideology scores 
developed by Brace et al. (2000), but only for a subset of cases for which those scores are 
available.  The data on personal factors are available from various state supreme court websites.  
I collected information on judges based on their biographical information and was able to find 
their race, gender, and the number of years on the bench.  Seventy percent of the instances, state 
high court judges are male while 30 percent of the instances, judges are female.  Anglo judges 
are 85 percent while 15 judges are non-Anglo.  The number of years on the bench varies from 1 
to 44 years in this dataset.             
 
Section 3.6: Criticism of Dataset 
 
There is some missing information in my dataset.  Law librarians in all states were 
instrumental in helping me gather information on judges’ personal factors, but there is some 
missing information in this dataset.  Some states do not have biographical information on older 
judges in their library, and their biographical information was not traceable.  I have missing 
information on aged justices for this reason, but it is only a small percentage of the dataset.      
 
Section 3.7: Methodology 
 
 In this dissertation I utilize frequency distributions, analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
correlation analysis, and binary logistic regression.  First, this dissertation employs the use of 
frequency distributions in order to describe all the variables in the dataset.  Second, I use 
bivariate correlations to examine the strength of the relationships between variables. Third, I 
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employ ANOVA analyses to compare means. Finally, for my main quantitative models I employ 
logistic regression analysis.   
 
Section 3.8: Conclusion 
 
My dissertation will seek to explain the voting behavior of judges in state courts of last 
resort in death penalty appeals cases.  To do this, I have constructed a dataset that encompasses 
all death penalty appeals cases in 30 states during the period 2000-2006. The dependent variable 
in my quantitative analyses will be the vote rendered by each judge in each case, which can take 
on two values: a vote to uphold the sentence of death, or a vote to reverse or vacate the sentence 
of death.  Drawing from the judicial literature, my independent variables will reflect personal 
factors, institutional factors, and environmental factors.  Personal factors include gender, race, 
and ideology of the judge.  Institutional factors include the party identification of the governor at 
the time the judge was appointed or elected, the party identification of the governor at the time 
the case was decided, and the party composition of the state House and Senate at the time the 
case was decided.  Environmental factors include the state murder rate, the number of executions 
since 1976, and the number of inmates on death row at the time of the decision. The theoretical 
underpinning of this research is the new institutionalism, which posits that judges’ decisions are 
shaped not only by judicial attitudes and strategic considerations, but by a variety of institutional 
and environmental factors.  I hypothesize that the institutional and environmental factors 
previously enumerated will have a significant impact on the voting behavior of state high court 
judges in death penalty appeals.  To test my hypotheses, I will use logistic regression to construct 
models incorporating all of the previously mentioned variables. 
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Chapter 4. Analysis  
 
Section 4.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter includes statistical analyses and answers my research question.  I test 
various hypotheses using frequency tables, ANOVA tests, correlation tests, and multivariate 
regression analysis in order to understand how certain factors influence judicial decision-making 
at the state level.      
 
Section 4.2: Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is a judicial vote on a death penalty appeals case, and it is either 
to uphold or reverse the sentence of death.  Table 4.1 illustrates the percent of instances where 
judges upheld or reversed the sentence of death.  Judges reversed the sentence of death in 21 
percent of all instances, while they upheld the sentence of death in 79 percent of all instances.  
This suggests that upholding the death sentence is the norm when judges decide death penalty 
cases, but there is enough variation to justify examining this as a dependent variable.   
 
Table 4.1 Vote Outcome 
 
 N % 
Vote to Uphold 3790 79 
Vote to Vacate 1017 21 







Section 4.3: Independent Variables (Institutional Variables) 
 
As a starting point, it seems logical that the party of the appointing governor would be 
relevant to this matter.  One would expect that conservative appointees would favor the death 
penalty and liberal appointees would not.  In a general sense, then, this variable embraces the 
basic tenets of the attitudinal model by using the party of the appointing governor as a proxy for 
a justice’s policy preferences.  Table 4.2 illustrates the breakdown of the party identification of 
the sitting governor at the time of judicial selection.  Whether judges are appointed or elected, I 
measured the party identification of the sitting governors in each state at the time of judicial 
selection.  It is almost evenly split between Republicans and Democrats; Republican governors 
controlled the executive office 45 percent of the instances while the Democratic governors 
controlled the office 55 percent of the instances between 2000 and 2006. 
Table 4.2 Party Identification of the Sitting Governor at the Time of Selection (RepGov) 
 
 N % 
Republicans 2174 45 
Democrats 2619 55 
Total 4873 100 
 
 
Table 4.3 also illustrates the breakdown of the party identification of the members in the 
lower chamber of state legislatures at the time when a judicial decision is reached.  It is evenly 
split between the two parties, and this even split allows for valid analysis.  Republicans 








Table 4.3 House Composition (2000-2006) 
 







Total 4873 100 
 
Table 4.4 is the breakdown of the party identification of the members in the upper 
chamber of state legislatures at the time when a judicial decision is reached.  It is evenly split 
between the two parties; Republicans had a majority in 53 percent of the instances while 
Democrats controlled in 47 percent of the instances. 
 
Table 4.4 Senate Composition (2000-2006) 
 







Total 4873 100 
 
 
Table 4.5 illustrates the breakdown of the party identification of the governor at the time 
of judicial decision.  Whether judges are appointed or elected, I measured the party identification 
of the sitting governors in each state at the time of judicial decision.  Unlike the other governor 
variable, which captures the party ideology of the sitting governor at the time of a judge’s 
appointment to a court, this variable (Gov) measures the party of the governor when the state 
high judge made a ruling on death penalty cases.  In terms of frequencies, Republican governors 
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are dominant in this variable, unlike in the governor variable (RepGov) where there is a pretty 
even split between the two parties.    
    Table 4.5 Governor (Gov) 
 
 N % 
Republicans 3266 67 
Democrats 1607 33 
Total 4873 100 
 
 
Section 4.4: Independent Variables (Environmental Variables) 
 
Beyond these institutional considerations, it is also necessary to consider some important 
environmental variables that affect judicial decision-making.  For example, Table 4.6 illustrates 
the number of death row inmates in each state.  The numbers are current as of October, 2006, 
and California (20%), Texas (12%), and Florida (12%) have the highest number of death row 
inmates in their state.  The numbers are concentrated in certain states, and this indicates the 
reality of death penalty use between 2000 and 2006 in 30 states.  The other 20 states do not have 












Table 4.6 Death Row Population as of October, 2006. 
 
States Numbers Percent of Total 
AL 192 5.82 
AZ 124 3.75 
AR 37 1.12 
CA 657 19.92 
CO 2 0.06 
CT 8 0.24 
DE 18 0.54 
FL 398 12.06 
GA 107 3.24 
ID 20 0.60 
IL 11 0.33 
IN 24 0.72 
KS 9 0.27 
KY 39 1.18 
LA 88 2.66 
MD 8 0.24 
MS 66 2.00 
MO 50 1.51 
MT 2 0.06 
NE 9 0.27 
NV 79 2.39 
NJ 11 0.33 
NM 2 0.06 
NY 1 0.03 
NC 184 5.57 
OH 192 5.82 
OK 89 2.69 
OR 33 1.00 
PA 228 6.91 
SC 66 2.00 
SD 4 0.12 
TN 108 3.27 
TX 392 11.88 
UT 9 0.27 
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VA 20 0.60 
WA 9 0.27 
WY 2 0.06 
Total 3298 100 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice, 2006.  Numbers are current as of October, 2006. 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows the number of executions in each state since 1976 as of 2006.  This also 
illustrates how the numbers are concentrated in certain states, and those states include Texas 
(36%), Virginia (10%), and Oklahoma (8%).  Therefore, these 3 states collectively account for 
60% of all executions in the country.  The reason for examining this figure is to see if states with 
a higher number of executions are those in which judges are upholding sentences of death at a 
higher level.  Conversely, a state could just have a higher level of executions without any 

























Table 4.7 Number of Executions since 1976 
State Number  Percent of Total 
TX 376 35.91 
VA 97 9.26 
OK 83 7.93 
MO 66 6.30 
FL 61 5.83 
NC 43 4.11 
GA 39 3.72 
SC 36 3.44 
AL 34 3.25 
AR 27 2.58 
LA 27 2.58 
OH 23 2.20 
AZ 22 2.10 
IN 17 1.62 
DE 14 1.34 
CA 13 1.24 
IL 12 1.15 
NV 12 1.15 
MS 7 .67 
UT 6 .57 
MD 5 .48 
WA 4 .38 
MT 3 .29 
NE 3 .29 
PA 3 .29 
US Govt 3 .29 
KY 2 .19 
OR 2 .19 
TN 2 .19 
CO 1 .10 
CT 1 .10 
ID 1 .10 
NM 1 .10 
WY 1 .10 
Total 1 100 
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Source: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf  (Numbers are current as of October, 
2006.) 
 
Section 4.5: Independent Variables (Personal Factors) 
 
It is also relevant to control for the personal traits of judges, including race and gender. A 
full 86 percent of the instances in my study are Caucasians, and the rest are non-Caucasian 
judges.  Table 4.8 shows the breakdown of judges based on gender.  Specifically, Table 4.8 
illustrates that 30 percent of the instances are female judges while 68 percent are male judges. 
Table 4.8 Race and Gender 
 
Race N % 
Anglo 4097 86 
Other 678 14 
Total 4873 100 
   
Gender   
Male 3334 68 
Female 1445 30 













Section 4.6: Test of Hypotheses 
 
Section 4.6.i: Institutional Variables 
 
 In this section, I use ANOVA tables to present a preliminary assessment of the value that 
individual variables may hold for explaining variation in my dependent variable.  Each 
independent variable is analyzed on its own, with a specific hypothesis offered regarding its 
influence. If there is some evidence that the variable is relevant, I then include it in a 
parsimonious regression model offered in the following section. 
To begin, a series of independent variables and hypotheses is derived from the 
institutional and non-institutional variables discussed earlier.  In keeping with the New 
Institutionalist model, I first examine an appointing governor’s influence on a judicial decision 
regardless of whether a judge is his/her appointee.  I test this hypothesis using ANOVA analysis.  
H1: Judges who are selected during times of Republican control of the executive branch 
are more likely to uphold the sentence of death than judges who are selected during times 

















Table 4.9 ANOVA: Vote on DP by Party of Governor at Time of Selection 
 
Party ID of the Sitting Governor  Mean N Std. Deviation 
Democrat .74 2591 .439 
Republican .85 2148 .354 
Total .79 4739 .407 
   Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) 15.103 1 15.103 93.076 .000 
Within Groups 768.663 4737 .162   
Vote on Death 
Penalty Cases * 
Party ID of the 
Sitting Governor 
at the Time of 
Appt or Election 
Total 783.766 4738 
   
 
Based on this information, I reject the null that there is no difference between the 
Republican control and the Democrat control of the executive branch at the time of judicial 
selection.  It is statistically significant at the .000 level.  As a result, H1 is tested in the regression 
model 1, Table 4.20 in Section 4.7 below, because there is statistical significance regarding this 
factor.  In short, the party of the appointing governor is clearly relevant to the ideology 
manifested by a judge once he or she begins serving on the Court.  As we expect, it seems as 
though Republican appointees are going to be more likely to uphold a sentence of death. This 
seems logical in light of the conservative ideology of the Republican Party.  Next, I turn to 
analysis of the influence of the sitting governor at the time that a judicial decision is made; 






H2: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when a Republican is in control 
of the executive branch than when a Democrat is in control of the executive branch. 
 
Table 4.10 ANOVA: Vote on DP by Party of Governor at Time of Decision 
 
Party ID of the Sitting Governor  Mean N Std. Deviation 
Democrat .75 1583 .434 
Republican .81 3224 .394 
Total .79 4807 .408 
   Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) 3.869 1 3.869 23.296 .000 
Within Groups 797.968 4805 .166   
Vote on Death 
Penalty Cases * 
Control of the 
State Executive 
Branch 
Total 801.837 4806    
 
Based on this information, I reject the null that there is no difference between Republican 
control and Democratic control of the executive branch at the time when a decision to uphold or 
overturn a death sentence is made.  Overall, the basic New Institutionalist perspective that actors 
in the other branches of government can influence the behavior of judges at the time a decision is 
made—perhaps out of judicial concern for things like noncompliance in implementation—seems 
to be validated in this table.  This result is statistically significant at the .000 level, and the 
variable is going to be tested in the parsimonious model for this reason.  Unlike ANOVA, the 
multivariate regression analysis can control for other factors that might influence variation in 
judicial voting behavior.  For this reason, any variable that exhibits statistical significance in 
ANOVA tables will be included in my multivariate analysis at the end of the chapter.   
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I now turn to my assessment of the potential influence that state legislatures have in the 
imposition of the death penalty.  This seems logical in light of the fact that New Institutionalist 
considerations have been very inclusive, and incorporate the preferences of multiple actors in the 
policy-making setting.  The following hypothesis is considered: 
H3: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when the lower chamber of the 
state legislature is controlled by the Republican Party.   
 
Table 4.11 ANOVA House 
 
Control of the State House Mean N Std. Deviation 
Democrat .79 2400 .406 
Republican .79 2335 .408 
Total .79 4735 .407 
   Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) .009 1 .009 .055 .814 
 




Control of the 
State House 
Total 782.427 4734    
 
Table 4.11 shows that there is no statistical significance in regard to a relationship 
between control of the state legislature and judicial decision-making on the death penalty. 
Therefore, control of the lower chamber of the legislature (House) by the Republican Party is not 
positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.  It may be the 
case that executives, who have the power to pardon, are a more germane consideration for judges 
who are making death penalty decisions.  In this regard, New Institutionalist perspectives may 
vary based on particular issues, and based on the nature of the court in question.  In this 
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particular issue category at the state level, no relationship is found.  This is why I exclude this 
variable from the parsimonious model later in the multivariate regression analysis. 
Beyond the state house, I also assess the effect of party control of the state senate by 
assessing the following hypothesis: 
H4: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when the upper chamber of the 
state legislature is controlled by the Republican Party.   
 
Table 4.12 ANOVA Senate 
 
Control of the State Senate Mean N Std. Deviation 
Democrat .80 2213 .399 
Republican .78 2545 .415 
Total .79 4758 .408 
   Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) .615 1 .615 3.693 .055 
Within Groups 791.528 4756 .166   
Vote on Death 
Penalty Cases * 
Control of the 
State Senate 
Total 792.143 4757    
 
There is some statistical significance, and therefore I reject the null hypothesis that the 
average value of the vote on death penalty cases is the same for Republicans and Democrats.  
Although the lower chamber offers no statistically significant findings, I must account for the 
possible interaction of the two, particularly when one party controls both the legislative and 
executive branch.  This is done through an analysis of the following hypothesis: 
H5: Judges are more likely to uphold the sentence of death when they are faced with 




Table 4.13 ANOVA Unified Republican Government 
 
Unified Republican Government Mean N Std. Deviation 
Unified Democratic Government .77 2876 .419 
Unified Republican Government  .81 1931 .392 
Total .79 4807 .408 
   Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) 1.641 1 1.641 9.851 .002 
Within Groups 800.196 4805 .167   
Vote on Death 





Total 801.837 4806 
   
 
The null hypothesis is that the mean is the same for all groups, and the mean refers to the 
average value of the dependent variable.  Since this is statistically significant at the 0.002 level, I 
reject the null hypothesis.  The average value of the dependent variable is not the same for the 
Republican controlled government and the rest.  In short, unified Republican control of state 
government is positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.  
Again, this idea is consistent with New Institutionalism, as there is a relationship between 
political actors and justice votes.  However, I do not include this variable in the parsimonious 
model because of an endogeneity problem.  Specifically, there is a correlation between this 
variable and my governor variable.  I must also submit that the presence of unified Republican 
control might serve as a proxy for highlighting an overwhelming political climate that embraces 
conservative principles.  Ultimately, because individual assessments of legislative bodies 
indicate no isolated effect on judicial behavior, and because gubernatorial variable do indicate 
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such an isolated impact on judicial behavior, I opt to use the gubernatorial variable in the 
regression model.  This decision is reinforced in the rejection of the following hypothesis. 
H6: Judges are more likely to reverse the sentence of death when they are faced with 
unified Democratic control of state government.   
 
Table 4.14 ANOVA Unified Democratic Government 
 
Unified Demo Govt Mean N Std. Deviation 
Unified Democratic Government .78 3789 .412 
Unified Republican Government .81 1018 .395 
Total .79 4807 .408 
   Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 







.421 1 .421 2.523 .112 
Within Groups 801.416 4805 .167   
Vote on Death 





Total 801.837 4806    
 
As the ANOVA table demonstrates, I fail to reject the null, and I conclude that unified 
Democratic control of state government is not positively associated with the probability of a vote 












Section 4.6. ii: Environmental Variables 
 
Section 4.6. ii.a: Bivariate Analysis: test of H7 and H8 
 
In Tables 15 and 16, I included environmental factors to test Hypothesis #7 and 
Hypothesis #8.   
H7: Judges in states with higher numbers of death row inmates are less likely to reverse the 
sentence of death.  In short, the number of death row inmates in a state is positively 
associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence. 
 
H8: Judges in states with higher number of executions (since 1976) are less likely to reverse 
the sentence of death.  In short, the number of executions in a state is positively associated 
with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence. 
 
The key environmental variable, current number of death row inmates since 1976 
(CurrentNum) shows strong correlation with the vote outcome at the 0.000 level.  The variable, 
CurrentNum is a number of death row inmates as of 2006.  I reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that judges in states with higher numbers of death row inmates are more likely to 
uphold the sentence of death.  In short, the number of death row inmates in a state is positively 
correlated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.  Consistently, the number of 
executions since 1976 (Num1976) is significant at the 0.000 level.  I reject the null and conclude 
that judges in states with higher number of executions since 1976 are more likely to uphold the 
sentence of death.  I assess that this is because political culture influences judicial decision-
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making, and I recognize the existence of political culture manifested throughout actors in the 
legal system, such as prosecutors, trial judges, and appellate judges. 
 
Table 4.15 Correlation: Vote by Number of Executions 
 
  Number of Executions Since 1976 
Pearson Correlation .131 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 





Table 4.16 Correlation: Vote by Current Death Row Population 
 
  Current Death Row Population (2009) 
Pearson Correlation .174 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 

























Section 4.6. iii: Personal Variables 
I turn now to the traits of the justices making the decisions.  
H9: Male judges are more likely than female judges to uphold the sentence of death.  In 
short, being male is positively associated with the probability of a vote to uphold a death 
sentence. 
Table 4.17 Vote and Gender ANOVA 
 
Gender of Judges Mean N Std. Deviation 
Female .80 1423 .400 
Male .79 3302 .410 
Total .79 4725 .407 
   







.219 1 .219 1.320 .251 








Total 783.732 4724 
   
 
In terms of gender characteristics, 1,139 female judges voted to uphold the sentence of 
death while 2,594 male judges voted to uphold the death penalty.  Gender did not matter in the 
vote outcome, and there is no correlation between the two variables.  Female judges voted to 
uphold a sentence of death in 80 percent of cases while they voted to vacate the sentence of death 
20 percent of the cases.  Male judges voted to uphold the sentence of death in 79 percent of cases 
while they voted to vacate the sentence 21 percent of cases.  As a result, no gender-related 




H10: Caucasian judges are more likely than non-Caucasian judges to uphold the sentence 
of death. In short, being Caucasian is positively associated with the probability of a vote to 
uphold a death sentence.  
The statistics are pretty similar for Caucasian judges and non-Caucasian judges.  
Caucasian judges voted to uphold the sentence of death in 79.5 percent of cases, and Caucasian 
judges voted to vacate death sentences 21 percent of cases.  Non-Caucasian judges voted to 
uphold the sentence of death 76.2 percent of cases while they voted to reverse the sentence in 
23.8 percent.  Overall, race is significant as a factor in my analysis, but it is not as significant as 
the key institutional variables in my analysis.  Race was significant at .052 level.  While many 
previous studies of the death penalty have focused on the race of the defendant, my work seems 
to indicate that the race of judges involved in the process may also be relevant. 
Table 4.18 Vote on Death Penalty Cases 
 
Race of Judges Mean N Std. Deviation 
Other .76 673 .426 
Anglo .80 4048 .404 
Total .79 4721 .407 
   
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 







.626 1 .626 3.784 .052 
Within 
Groups 
781.188 4719 .166 
  
Vote on Death 
Penalty Cases * 
Race of Judges 




At this point, a justice’s tenure is examined to see if longer serving judges are more likely 
to uphold a sentence of death.  This idea is incorporated through an assessment of the following 
hypothesis: 
H11: Judges who have served longer on the bench are more likely to reverse the sentence of 
death. In short, there is a positive relationship between length of time on the bench and the 




Table 4.19 Correlations b/w Vote and Years 
 
  Number of Years on the Bench 
Pearson Correlation -.024 
Sig. (2-tailed) .095 




 Overall, results show that there is no correlation between voting behavior and the length 
of time on the bench as shown in Table 4.19.  While other studies that examine Supreme Court 
justices have seen differences in voting behavior associated with terms served, I see no such 
effect in terms of state appellate court voting on the death penalty. 
 
Section 4.7: Discussion of Regression Models 
 
 The collective information from my ANOVA table is consolidated into the regression 
analysis below.  I have elected to include the variables that indicated relevance for explaining 
variation in the dependent variable.  This allows for a more parsimonious assessment and 
minimizes the risk of colinearity.  The equation for the regression model is as follows: 
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Y (Vote to Uphold Death Penalty) = x1 (RepGov-at selection) + x2 (Race) + x3 (Number of 
Executions) +x4 (Number of Death Row Inmates) + x5 (Gov- Decision) 
 
Table 4.20 Regression Model 1: Binomial Logistic Regression 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
RepGov (Selection) 0.437 0.080 29.645 1 0.000 1.549 
Caucasian 0.253 0.108 5.458 1 0.019 1.287 
Number of Executions since1976 0.002 0.000 30.571 1 0.000 1.002 
Current Number of Death Row Inmates 0.002 0.000 75.996 1 0.000 1.002 
Gov (Decision) 0.052 0.080 0.424 1 0.515 1.054 




In the parsimonious model (4.20), I examine the role of institutional, environmental, and 
personal factors in the judicial decision-making process, and it allows me to test several 
hypotheses.  Statistical significance indicates that this regression model is highly predictive of 
whether judges uphold or reverse the sentence of death.  Specifically, the key institutional 
variable, Republican governor at the time of selection (RepGov) has a coefficient of 0.437, and it 
is statistically significant at the .000 level.  Therefore, I reject the null for Hypothesis #1 and 
submit that, ceteris paribus, judges who are selected while the Republican governors are in 
control of the executive office are more likely to uphold the sentence of death.  On average, 
judges who are selected while Republican governors are in control of the executive office are 
more likely to uphold the sentence of death.  The finding that appeared in the ANOVA table, 
then, remains relevant even after controlling for other plausible alternative sources of variation. 
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.080 




Environmental factors turn out to be statistically significant as well.  Both variables, the 
number of executions since 1976 (Num1976) and the current number of death row inmates 
(CurrentNum), have a coefficient of 0.002 and are statistically significant at 0.000 level.  
Therefore, I reject the null for Hypothesis #7 and conclude that judges in states with higher 
numbers of death row inmates are more likely to uphold the sentence of death.  In short, the 
number of death row inmates in a state is positively associated with the probability of a vote to 
uphold a death sentence.  Consequently, I reject the null for Hypothesis #8 and conclude that 
judges in states with higher number of executions (since 1976) are more likely to uphold the 
sentence of death.  In short, the number of previous executions in a state is positively associated 
with the probability of a vote to uphold a death sentence.  It may be the case that judges in a state 
that has a history of placing inmate on death row will fit into the political culture by continuing 
this trend.  In a general sense, this notion extends the range of New Institutionalism by invoking 
the notion that public opinion and political climate—beyond formal political actors—can impact 
judicial behavior.  This seems to be a principle that is more likely to manifest itself at the state 
level, where the protection of life tenure is absent.  On a basic level, this finding suggests that 
environmental factors influence the death penalty decision in state high courts. 
 One of the institutional variables, Governor (Gov), has a coefficient of 0.052 and is not 
statistically significant.  I accept the null that judges are not more likely to uphold the sentence of 
death while the Republican governors are in control of the executive office at the time of 
decision.  It appears that judges make decisions without any influence from sitting governors.  
New institutionalism does not seem to be relevant here.  The empirical analysis shows that the 
party of the governor at the time of the judicial selection is the only institutional factor that 
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influences the judicial outcome.  The analysis demonstrates a strong linkage between the judicial 
vote and the party identification of the executive who placed the judge on the court, but there is 
no such linkage between judges and subsequent executives.  The reality of the pardon process 
seems to be an irrelevant consideration in driving judicial decisions. 
In addition to these results, I offer two more regression models that test the impact of the 
method of judicial selection on voting.   In other words, I attempt to locate whether party of the 
appointer remains relevant even in states where judges are not appointed exclusively by the 
governor.  I also examine whether any institutional variables become significant when the nature 
of confirmation is controlled.  Table 4.21 analyzes the voting behavior of judges who are 
selected through gubernatorial appointment or merit selection. 
Table 4.21 Binomial Logistic Regression: Model 2 
(Judges Selected by Merit Plan and Gubernatorial Appointment Only) 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
RepGov (Selection) 0.646 0.133 23.572 1 0.000 1.909 
Caucasian -0.027 0.134 0.042 1 0.838 0.973 
Number of Executions since 1976 0.000 0.002 0.001 1 0.972 1.000 
Current Number of Death Row Inmates 0.002 0.000 87.282 1 0.000 1.002 
Gov (Decision) 0.196 0.138 2.015 1 0.515 1.054 





This model only refers to those judges selected via gubernatorial appointment and merit 
selection.  I include merit selection because it involves a component of gubernotorial influence.  
The key variable, Republican governor at the time of judicial selection (RepGov), yields a 
Nagelkerke R-squared .111 




coefficient of .646, and is statistically significant at the 0.000 level.  On average, judges who are 
selected while Republican governors are in control of the executive office are more likely to 
uphold the sentence of death if judges are selected either through gubernatorial appointment or 
merit selection.  This seems logical in that these systems enable a governor to more easily see a 
like-minded actor ascend to a state court of last appeal.  However, another institutional variable, 
Gov, yields a coefficient of 0.196, and it is not statistically significant.  This indicates that the 
current composition of the executive branch does not matter as much as the composition at the 
time of judicial selection.  It seems reasonable to assume that judges who are appointed by 
Republican governors will vote conservatively, but it is more difficult to establish the influence 
of a sitting Republican president.  In terms of the non-institutional variables, only one of the 
environmental variables, current number of death row inmates (CurrentNum) is statistically 
significant, and yields a coefficient of 0.002 in this model. Once again, even when the nature of 
selection method is controlled for, the state’s culture toward the execution of inmates seems to be 
relevant for explaining variation in votes to uphold sentences of death. 
I now present a model that addresses the behavior of judges who are elected or 
legislatively appointed.  The general supposition related to this idea is that these justices will be 







Table 4.22 Binomial Logistic Regression: Model 3 (Judges Selected by Election and 
Legislative Appointment only) 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
RepGov (Selection) 0.120 0.119 1.009 1 0.315 1.127 
Caucasian 0.730 0.187 15.168 1 0.000 2.075 
Number of Executions since1976 0.003 0.001 18.786 1 0.000 1.003 
Current Number of Death Row Inmates 0.000 0.001 0.183 1 0.669 1.000 
Gov (Decision) 0.132 0.111 1.432 1 0.231 1.141 





This model indicates that racial criterion and the number of death row inmates are significant.  
However, no institutional variables are relevant here. The following section explains the 
differences between this model and the other selection-based model. 
 
Section 4.8: Comparison of the Two Models 
 
The models demonstrate that judges exhibit different voting behaviors based on their 
method of selection.  Republican governor at the time of judicial selection (RepGov) is a 
statistically significant variable in Table 4.21, while the same variable is not statistically 
significant in Table 4.22.  The only difference between the two models is the method of selection 
of the judges.  The former model analyzes the voting behavior of judges who are selected 
through the method of gubernatorial appointment and merit selection, and the latter deals with 
the judges who are elected.  Clearly, it shows that the method of selection does matter in the 
analysis of judicial votes in death penalty decisions, and judges who are selected through 
gubernatorial appointment and merit selection are more likely to uphold the sentence of death 
when they are appointed by Republican governors.  It is logical to predict that governors select 
Nagelkerke R-squared .085 




judges who share similar ideologies, so this finding seems appropriate.  After all, it is harder for 
a governor to see a like-minded individual ascend to a state court of last appeal when the 
governor is dependent on the citizenry or a legislature to elect a judge—as opposed to the 
governor appointing a judge.    Consequently, judges seem to reflect a governor’s preferences 
when they vote—provided they are appointed by that governor.  Although the literature on the 
method of selection does not suggest that the method is important, there is some evidence in my 
research to suggest that the method of selection plays a role in a justice’s decision to uphold a 
sentence of death from a lower court. 
 
Section 4.9: Conclusion 
 
The empirical analysis above shows that there are a few key variables that influence 
judicial decision-making relative to death penalty cases.  The key variable here is the 
institutional variable, Republican governor at the time of judicial selection (RepGov).  I find it 
remarkable that sitting governors do not influence judicial votes because of the possibility for 
executive stays of execution.  Further, I separate judges into two categories: those who are 
appointed and those who are elected.  My results suggest that judges who are appointed by 
Republican governors have a tendency to vote more conservatively in death penalty cases than 
judges who are appointed by Democratic governors.  However, this finding does not hold true 
for judges who are elected or appointed by legislators.  This means that the method of selection 
definitely matters in explaining judicial behavior of state high judges.   
Overall, though, the lack of a connection between the sitting governor at the time of a 
decision and judges on last courts of appeal does allow me to reexamine the notion of judicial 
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independence.  Ultimately, I can conclude that judges exercise judicial independence once they 
are on the bench, as there is no evidence of a relationship between their votes and the ideologies 
of political actors in the other branches.  However, the way that judges are selected definitely 
influences their voting behavior, since governors have strong influence on who reaches the bench 
in states where judges are appointed by that governor.  In examining personal variables, I found 
that race matters to a degree, in the sense that weak evidence suggests that minority justices are 
more likely to vote against a sentence of death—and this seems more likely when the judges are 
elected by the citizenry or through the state legislature.   
Environmental factors, both the number of death row inmates and the number of 
executions, seem to matter in explaining death penalty cases.  Again, this may be the result of the 
fact that an overall political culture and a societal acceptance of the death penalty’s persistence 
seems to be captured in these variables.  After all, the number of executions in a state goes 
beyond the judicial decisions to uphold sentences—although that certainly is a relevant 
consideration.  (When judges uphold sentences at a higher rate, the number of death row inmates 
will increase).  Therefore, my contention is that states with a high number of death row inmates 
and executions are likely to be those that embrace the process in various aspects of society—
from prosecution offices, to jury boxes, to the minds of those who appoint (or elect) judges.  My 
environmental variables, then, are indicative of broader trends in a state’s political climate.  Still, 
such considerations are a part of New Institutionalist perspectives, as this theory is not limited to 
formal political actors.  An ancillary relevance of my work, then, involves extending traditional 
perspectives of New Institutionalism to incorporate societal influences on judicial behavior.  Of 
course, I must admit that these societal influences ultimately translate into political changes—
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which in turn translate into changes in court composition.  In summary, though, the beauty of 
New Institutionalism as a theory is that it allows for all of these varied implications to be taken 
into account—while other theories of court decision-making are more limited because of their 


































Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
 
Section 5.1: Objective of this Dissertation 
 
My dissertation seeks to explain the voting behavior of judges in state high courts of last 
resort in death penalty appeals cases.  My goal is to examine the role of various factors in the 
judicial decision-making process by studying death penalty appeals cases from states across the 
nation.  Drawing on the judicial literature, I consider three general categories of influence on 
judicial behavior: institutional factors, environmental factors, and personal factors.  The 
dissertation ultimately seeks to explain and predict the judicial voting behavior of state high 
court judges and to reexamine the role of state high courts in American democracy.  Little 
research explores the voting behavior of state high courts judges, and this dissertation fills the 
gap in the literature by contributing new empirical research findings to the field of American 
politics.  
As I explained in Ch.2, four major theories explain judicial behavior: the legal model, the 
attitudinal model, strategic model, and the new institutionalism model.  The theoretical 
underpinning of this research is new institutionalism, which posits that judges’ decisions are 
shaped not only by judicial attitudes and strategic considerations, but also by a variety of 
institutional and environmental factors.  Ultimately, logistic regression analysis shows that the 
institutional and environmental factors have a significant impact on the voting behavior of state 
high court judges in death penalty appeals cases, and this is consistent with New Institutionalism.  
In summary, my research findings demonstrate that New Institutionalism is a viable theory that 
helps political scientists understand and predict judicial behavior.  After all, the political parties 
of appointing governors are relevant for explaining judicial behavior.  Furthermore, this finding 
  
90 
also reinforces the basic principles of checks and balances that were so valued by the Founders.  
For those that deride the behavior of judges as somehow being undemocratic, my work seems to 
allay these fears.  A reiteration of key findings through the lens of separation of powers and 
democratic theory will allow me to bring my work to its conclusion. 
 
Section 5.2: Summary of Findings Regarding the Death Penalty Decisions 
Section 5.2.i: Institutional Factors of Sitting Governors and Appointing Governors 
 
My research indicates that institutional factors do matter in judicial decision-making, and 
this idea has application for the decision-making process of state high courts.  Based on the 
empirical analysis, I not only recognize the substantial impact that Republican governors have on 
state high judges through their appointment powers, I also identify evidence of judicial 
independence after the selection process has taken place.  Perhaps Republican governors appoint 
judges who share their ideologies and preferences, and the influence of Republican governors in 
judicial decision-making is systematic in that sense.   
This is consistent with Dahl’s observation at the federal level.  Dahl mentioned that 
policy views of the judicial branch are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant 
among the law-making majorities of the United States (1957).  Based on my research, his 
statement also holds at the state level.  My data reveal that judges who are appointed by 
Republican governors seem to exhibit conservative voting behavior in deciding death penalty 
appeals cases, but their voting behavior does not change based on the current composition of the 
state government at the time of judicial decision-making.  This is evidence of judicial 
independence in that the judiciary is insulated from the executive and legislative power once it 
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begins its decision-making processes.  Therefore, once judges become judges through various 
methods of selection, they seem to be insulated from the influence of other branches.   
In summary, once judges become state high judges, my data show that they enjoy 
freedom and independence in the decision-making process regardless of the current composition 
of the state government.  For this reason, I conclude that governors exert profound influence in 
shaping the direction of the judiciary through their appointment powers, but not subsequently.  
However, Democratic governors do not have the same power over judicial results, and I could 
only explain and predict the voting behavior of judges who are appointed by Republican 
governors when it comes to having an affirmative impact on the validation of death penalty 
sentences.  Given the strong ties between the Republican Party and conservative views on 
criminal activity, it seems as though the imposition of the death penalty may be a more relevant 
factor within the political culture pervading key non-governmental organizations related to that 
party.   
 
Section 5.2.ii: Environmental Factors 
 
Beyond these institutional considerations, I also consider environmental factors including 
the number of executions since 1976 and the number of inmates on death row at the time of the 
decision.  I recognize the evidence of the influence of environmental factors in the decision-
making by recording the number of death penalty appeals cases, the number of executions, and 
the number of inmates who have been given the death penalty; however, it is hard to measure the 
true impact of those variables using quantitative research.  The high number of executions and 
the inmates all increase the likelihood of judges’ decision to uphold the sentence of death.  
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Nevertheless, the imposition of the death penalty by a judge will likewise increase the number of 
inmates on death row.  Additional qualitative research can answer more questions as to which 
direction is more relevant in defining this relationship.  Of course, the broader message here is 
that some states simply sentence defendants to death more frequently than others, while other 
states tend to opt for life in prison.  This leads me to believe that it seems to matter where one 
commits murder, because this may be the single most relevant determinant in explaining the 
severity of the punishment and the fate of the defendant.  For example, a murder defendant in 
Texas is more likely to get the death penalty affirmed in the state high court than a similarly-
situated defendant in Kansas.  Kansas institutionalized the death penalty by law, but there seems 
to be a de facto moratorium on the death penalty today.  As a result, there are few inmates on 
death row.  In addition, it follows that judges will be less likely to uphold sentences of death in 
such a state where the use of the procedure is widely frowned upon.       
 
Section 5.2.iii: Personal Factors 
 
In addition, I find it troubling that extralegal factors matter in judicial decision-making.  
According to my analysis, race does matter in decision-making—although it is not as significant 
as the key institutional variables in my analysis.  My data indicate that judicial decisions are 
impacted by judges’ race, and it does not seem fair to maintain a system that allows these 
personal factors to influence the decision-making process in death penalty appeals cases.  Baldus 
et al. argue, “Every court that has addressed the issues has condemned the idea of race 
influencing the administration of the death penalty” (Baldus et al., 1998, p. 356).  The Supreme 
Court discussed such matters in Furman v. Georgia (1972), where the disparity of the death 
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penalty’s application across different races played a role in a moratorium on the process.  In my 
research, I extend the scope of the Supreme Court’s concerns by observing that a judges’ race 
influences the decision-making process as it pertains to the death penalty.  Baldus et al. made a 
similar empirical observation when they found out that race of the defendants influence the 
administration of the death penalty; “for a nation with a historical commitment to equal justice 
under the law, the story is a disappointment” (Baldus, et al., 1998, p. 356).  My research offers a 
unique empirical assessment related to the race of those that sentence defendants to die.  Future 
research may wish to examine the interaction of these two criteria.  While this has been done in 
regard to the defendant-victim dynamic, the judge-defendant-victim dynamic has not yet been 
assessed.     
Ultimately, judges administer justice, and we put trust in their ability to read the law and 
judge fairly.  For example, survey results indicate that the public perceives the judicial process 
with respect, and myth, to some degree.  According to Scheb and Lyons, “The myth of legality 
holds that cases are decided by the application of legal rules formulated and applied through a 
politically and philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning” (Scheb and Lyons, 2000, p. 
930).  Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998) also argue that “judges help perpetuate the myth of 
legality among their attentive publics by framing their decisions in legalistic terms” (cited in 
Scheb and Lyons, 2000, p. 933).  Also, Scheb and Lyons add that that “the myth of legality is a 
viable component of American political culture that assists citizens in making sense of the 
Supreme Court’s decision-making process” (Scheb and Lyons, 2000, p. 929).  In some sense, 
this legitimizes judicial decision-making.  Overall, “the fictive idea of principled legality” 
(Brisbin, 1996) is a crucial source of the Court’s institutional legitimacy (Fiscus, 1991).  There is 
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no doubt that legitimacy is important, and citizens must have a level of trust in government 
officials within a democracy, especially judges whose roles are tied to connotations of fairness.   
But there is something to be said when we know that there are problems in the system 
and no actions are taken.  If personal factors do influence judges and their decision-making 
processes, then no one would deny that justice is tainted in our society.  Perhaps we can start 
demanding that our judges discard their personal feelings in their decision-making process, and 
this may alert them to think twice about their decision and its implication in our society.  While 
this may seem a bit idealistic, the presence of, and publication of, data that indicate the potential 
for racial bias from judges might make said actors more acutely aware of their personal biases.  
When any science, including political science, can arrive at a point where its findings impact 
human behavior, then it has been successful in its objectives.  Ultimately, I recognize that race 
matters in the decision-making process, and I hope my research findings can raise awareness 
among the public and judges.   
 
Section 5.3: Summary of Findings 
 
The aforementioned analysis indicates that the institutional and environmental factors do 
help to explain the voting behavior of state high court judges.  Ultimately, this dissertation tests 
New Institutionalism theories at the state level, and it focuses on the relationship between 
members of different branches of governments.  The models show weak support for New 
Institutionalism in judicial decision-making at the state level.   
Overall, I conclude that judges exercise judicial independence once they are on the 
bench, and there is empirical evidence for this.  My dissertation reveals that there is one 
institutional variable that matters greatly, and that is the presence of the Republican governor at 
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the time of judicial selection.  The way they are selected definitely influences their judicial 
behavior since governors have a strong influence over who gets to be judges in states where 
judges are appointed by the governors.  The influence of Republican governors is two-fold, and I 
distinguish the role of Republican governors at the time of judicial selection from the role of 
Republican governors at the time of decision.  According to this analysis, the presence of 
Republican governors at the time of selection influenced judicial voting, but the presence of 
Republican judges at the time of judicial decision-making did not matter.  In summary, my 
research indicates that the presence of Republican governors at the time of judicial selection 
particularly matters in the death penalty decision-making process, and their role is substantial in 
shaping judicial decisions.   
The most notable finding in this dissertation is that there is empirical evidence that judges 
practice judicial independence in regard to being insulated from the influence of the actors in 
other branches of government.  However, a more comprehensive examination of judicial 
independence must also account for influences arising from society itself.  That is where my 
environmental variables become relevant.  And, both environmental factors—the number of 
death row inmates and the number of executions since 1976—matter in explaining death penalty 
cases, and this calls for more research.  In the state court literature, the consensus is that 
environmental factors play a critical role in decision-making (Hall, 1992), and my research is 
consistent with this finding.  Specifically, my research illustrates that justices are constrained or 
influenced by their political environment, in terms of its general acceptance of, or aversion to, 
the death penalty.  In addition, the institutional rules—in regard to method of judicial selection—
are also relevant; although, no causal mechanism is imputed here, as a judge is not going to 
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actively say “I am an elected judge, therefore, I will vote this way.”  Rather, they have their own 
policy preferences.  However, those policy preferences are more likely to support the death 
penalty when a Republican governor has selected “them” to ascend to a state court of last appeal.  
Of course, in making these selections, governors may not want to rely on gender as a proxy for 
ideology, but that governor might gain some relevant information regarding views on the death 
penalty from examining racial characteristics.  Perhaps certain environmental concerns related to 
racial demographics influence subsequent judicial behavior.  Given the expansive reach of New 
Institutionalist principles, it seems likely that considering the social background of a justice is 
acceptable.  Future research under the heading of New Institutionalism may wish to address this 
matter. 
 
Section 5.4: The Results and the Notion of Judicial Independence  
 
What is more intriguing in this dissertation is that judges do not seem to be constrained 
by the power of the other two branches of government in their decision-making.  This indicates 
that state high court judges enjoy judicial independence, and they are not as accountable as they 
can be to public preferences as they manifest in political actors.  My research indicates that the 
presence of Republican governors at the time of judicial selection particularly matters in the 
death penalty decision-making process, and their role is substantial in shaping judicial decisions.  
Unfortunately, there is no measure of public opinion on the death penalty at the state level, and I 
can’t comment on the responsiveness of judges to those specific matters.   
The ideal of judicial independence has long been addressed by scholars of American 
Politics.  Perhaps this is because “A belief in judicial independence exists in the United States 
alongside an equally strong belief in democratic accountability” (Gur-Arie and Wheeler, 2002, 
  
97 
133).  On the one hand, judges get to enjoy freedom from external pressures, and some believe 
that this is crucial in a democratic government, noting “judicial independence is perhaps most 
important in enabling judges to protect individual rights even in the face of popular opposition” 
(Gur-Arie and Wheeler, 2002, 133).  On the other hand, there is the notion of accountability, and 
it seems to conflict with judicial independence.  “The idea that judges should be democratically 
accountable meant the public, directly or representationally, has a legitimate say in how the 
courts should perform” (Gur-Arie and Wheeler, 2002, 133).   
In a speech in 2003 at the Arab Judicial Forum in Bahrain, Justice O’Connor mentioned 
that it is crucial to maintain judicial independence (Toobin, 2007, 250): 
Judicial independence allows judges to make decisions that may be  contrary to the 
interests of other branches of government.  Presidents,  ministers, and legislators at 
times rush to find convenient solutions to the  exigencies of the day.  An 
independent judiciary is uniquely positioned to  reflect on the impact of those 
solutions on rights and liberty, and must act  to ensure that those values are not subverted. 
    
Herein, I examined the influence of the executive and the legislative branch on judicial 
voting behavior of state high judges and found that they are insulated from the pressures of other 
branches in their decision-making process.  Judges do not seem to modify their voting behavior 
in relation to these actors, and I also find that the method of selection influences the voting 
behavior of judges.  My assumption is that judges who are appointed by Republican governors 
are predisposed to certain ideological positions, and Republican governors have a way of leaving 
their legacies beyond their terms through the appointment process (Goldman, 2009).  One can 
find this troubling in that members of the executive branch get to influence the judicial decision-
making process and shape judicial outcomes.  However, from the opposing perspective, it is 
conceivable that the system of checks and balances is operational at the state level, in the sense 
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that governors have substantial impact on judicial decision-making.  And, our Constitution does 
offer the appointment power to executives, with the “advice and consent” of the legislative 
branch.  Perhaps my results indicate the need for such “advice and consent” at the state level. 
  Of course, to continue to illustrate the tension surrounding this idea, one can also find 
relief in the evidence of judicial independence at the state level, and this is a consolation to many 
who are concerned with the notion of justice and fairness in the judiciary.  Judicial independence 
is indispensable in a democratic society, and my dissertation demonstrates that the American 
judiciary still upholds the democratic ideal of judicial independence.  Based on this research, it is 
conceivable to conclude that the state high judges function according to the democratic ideals 
embedded in the Constitution. 
Perhaps there is a need to reconcile the two democratic values at this point.  Sharma 
(2009) argues that two democratic ideals create tensions.  On the one hand, there is a value of 
checks and balances.  On the other hand, there is judicial independence.  Sharma states that 
independent judiciary is an overstatement, and many scholars might be able to attest to that with 
their research on Supreme Court decision-making.  In contrast, my research cannot attest to his 
argument, and the key difference is that my work involves judicial behavior at the state level.  
This dissertation involves state court decisions, and there are differences between state high 
courts decision-making and the Supreme Court decision-making.   
More specifically, the nature of the two courts is different in that they have different 
institutional rules and different jurisdictions.  For instance, U.S. Supreme Court judges are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate while state high court judges are 
selected through the method of appointment, merit selection, election, and legislative 
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appointment.  Supreme Court justices are more insulated from other branches of government 
than are state high court judges.  Supreme Court justices have life tenure, get to grant the writ of 
certiorari, use the rule of four, have a jurisdiction of all 50 states, and the Court is the ultimate 
court of last resort.  State high court judges do not have any of the privileges listed above, and 
their authority is not as enormous and powerful as that of Supreme Court Justices.  In fact, state 
high court judges struggle with huge workload, and they are the de facto court of last resort since 
many cases end in state high courts.  Of course, all of this suggests that judges at the state level 
should be susceptible to the influences of other actors.  Even so, I find no evidence of such 
influences.  Perhaps that makes my work more relevant to supporting principles of judicial 
independence than scholarship that has previously addressed this issue at the level of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
Sharma’s concern echoes the voice of Shane, who argues that judicial relations have a lot 
to do with judicial independence.  He states, “the quality of state judicial relations with 
governors and state legislators will have an impact on the pursuit and protection of judicial 
independence” (Shane, 1998, p. 53).  My dissertation demonstrates that judges do maintain 
judicial independence regardless of the composition of other branches.  Once judges become 
state high judges, they are able to judge without any interference from legislative and executive 
power.  The only potential constraints I find on judicial independence, then, emanate from the 






Section 5.5: Normative Implications 
 
Initially, I wrote my dissertation to unveil the mysterious decision-making process of 
state high court judges in order to understand the judicial decision-making process at the state 
level.  My ultimate goal was to find the role of other branches of government on the judicial 
branch, to assess the level of judicial independence, and to comment on the quality of democracy 
based on the empirical analysis of judicial votes of state judges.  At this point, I find it necessary 
to comment on implications of this research; otherwise, this dissertation is a mere collection of 
numbers.  In addition, it is imperative for me to comment on the role of other branches of 
government on judicial decision-making to assess the level of judicial independence and to 
comment on the quality of democracy based on the empirical analysis of judicial votes of state 
judges.       
First, I presented research findings to illustrate that members of other branches influence 
judicial decision-making earlier in the dissertation.  I mentioned in chapter 4 that judges who are 
appointed by Republican governors exhibit conservative voting behavior in death penalty cases.  
But I was not able to observe the same pattern for judges who are appointed by Democrat 
governors and judges who are elected.  I also presented evidence of judicial independence by 
analyzing the voting behavior of judges who are on the bench while the sitting governor is a 
Republican.  I demonstrated in this dissertation that judges who are appointed by Republican 
governors vote conservatively, and the party of the appointing governors matters in explaining 
the vote outcome.   
Robert Dahl (1957) made a critical argument at the federal level, and he argues that 
judges are not only appointed by the leader of the executive branch, but also confirmed by the 
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members of the legislative branch.  Dahl (1957, p. 285) pointed out that the “policy views 
dominant on the Court are never long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law-
making majorities of the United States” in his renowned article, Decision-making in Democracy.  
At the federal level, he argued that the ruling regime, including the President and the senators, 
controls the judiciary by respectively appointing and confirming justices.  At the state level, 
empirical evidence in this dissertation shows that Dahl’s warning against the creation of the 
ruling regime may be needed at the state level as well.   
There is a lesson to be learned here since the party of the appointing governor influences 
the way state high court judges vote in death penalty cases.  Perhaps voters should think twice 
about the value of their votes when they go to the poll to elect the governor, as they may not 
realize that their vote for governors and the members of state house of representatives have a lot 
to do with the administration of justice in their state.  Another lesson is that the method of 
selection of state judges does make a difference in the administration of justice.  Perhaps Dahl’s 
observation is only applicable in states where judges are selected through appointment and merit 
selection.  Or, perhaps the connection that Dahl hypothesizes between political officials and 
justices will occur at more of a time lag in those states where judges are elected—as those same 
voters are likely to engender broader regime shifts, as well.  In any event, it appears that the 
method of selection matters in that appointed judges vote differently than elected judges.  Based 
on these findings, one can speculate that appointed judges are less independent in that they 
reflect preferences of the governors who appointed them.  States with election as their method of 
selection definitely give judges more independence than those states where judges are appointed.  
That is mainly because the method of election eliminates the possibility of gubernatorial 
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influence and increase accountability.  This is rather ironic in that one would expect elected 
judges to be more likely to see their independence compromised.  Elected judges are expected to 
be more accountable to the public because voters get to choose to elect them or not.  But the 
result of this dissertation indicates that elected judges show more freedom in their voting 
behavior in death penalty cases than appointed judges.        
Secondly, I found evidence of judicial independence at the state level by examining 
voting behavior of state high court judges in my dissertation.  The party ideology of the sitting 
governors did not influence their voting behavior once on a court, and this indicates that judges 
practice judicial independence once they are on the bench.  The Founding Fathers granted judges 
judicial independence, and my research indicates that state high judges practice judicial 
independence once they are on the bench.  In Federalist #78, Hamilton emphasized the 
importance of judicial independence in American government.  Also, many scholars call 
attention to the importance of judicial independence in American government.  For instance, 
Shane argues “The quality of state judicial relations with governors and state legislators will 
have an impact on the pursuit and protection of judicial independence” (Shane, 1998, p. 53).  
This means that the members of other branches influence judicial decision-making at the state 
level, and governors and legislatures have the power to jeopardize the protection of judicial 
independence.  Courts neither have the power of purse nor sword, and the notion of judicial 
independence is the only unique power Founding Fathers granted.   
 Lastly, it is necessary to comment on the quality of democracy based on my analysis.  
Research findings indicate that state high judges practice judicial independence once they are on 
the bench.  But some methods of selection such as appointment and merit selection gives 
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enormous amount of power to governors, and they get to shape judicial outcome in death penalty 
cases.  It appears that the executive branch controls the judiciary by employing the method of 
gubernatorial appointment and merit selection.  The government is designed to maintain the 
system of checks and balances, but it seems that the executive branch controls the judiciary 
tremendously by employing the method of gubernatorial appointment and merit selection in their 
state.  Again, I arrive at the same argument, and that is Dahl’s warning against the creation of the 
ruling regime must be respected at the state level, especially in states where judges are selected 
through appointment or merit selection.  The system is democratic, but the protection of judicial 
independence would make the system more democratic in my view.  That in itself is a journey 
that requires time and critical assessment of our system, and the notion of judicial independence 
is indispensible in the journey as we create a more democratic system.             
 
Section 5.6: Limitations and Future Research 
 
Although the findings of the research suggest that institutional factors play a major role in 
death penalty appeals cases, further research is necessary to determine whether the trend is 
evidenced in other times periods.  My research only analyzes death penalty appeals cases 
between 2000 and 2006, and additional empirical analysis will be necessary to determine if the 
findings continue overtime by extending the database.  Also, it is necessary to incorporate 
interviews and cases studies in order to study the significance of environmental factors and 
personal factors.  For instance, doing case studies and surveys might be a potential solution to tap 
into the state culture and environmental factors to offer insights into their influence on the 
decision-making process.  There is no doubt that each state court has its own culture or way of 
handling death penalty appeals.  However, it is beyond my ability to measure and analyze that 
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quantitatively in this dissertation, and I leave this daunting task up to future researchers to 
recognize and study each court qualitatively.   
Additionally, future researchers have great advantages in studying the role of personal 
factors in high courts.  Growing number of minority judges and female judges are filling seats in 
state high courts each year, and this may lead future scholars to analyze the role of race and 
gender in the death penalty decision-making process with more clarity.  Also, studying the 
influence of race is important, but it would make more sense to incorporate the race of other 
political actors in the process: defendants, prosecutors, juries, and attorneys. 
Also, another limitation of my research is that I only examine the final vote of judicial 
decisions.  By studying the final votes of state high court judges, I overlook other stages of the 
decision-making process.  Hammond et al. argues that “decision-making by the Supreme Court 
involves several stages” (Hammond et al., 2005, p. 2).  Sharma argues that he focused on the 
final vote in his research, and that is “largely because it is the most readily quantified 
manifestation of judicial behavior” (Sharma, 2009, p. 244).  Even so, the decision to select a case 
in the first place is an important aspect of judicial behavior, and deserves additional work in this 
context.   
Furthermore, I would suggest that future research utilize the role of public opinion at the 
state level.  Currently, there is no systematic record of public opinion in regard to the death 
penalty, but I find it important to observe the role of public opinion in the judicial decision 
making process.  That can measure the empirical influence of public opinion, and I think it will 
provide researchers more insight into the inquiry of the judicial decision making process.  
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Specifically, it would help to illuminate the role of the environmental factors that I examined 
herein. 
 There are several other limitations in this research.  One limitation is the measure of the 
ideology scores of state supreme court judges; judges have the same PAJID (party-adjusted 
judges ideology scores) for the entire 5 years between 2000 and 2005, and many judges in the 
same court share the scores.  That limits my ability to assess the basic principles of the attitudinal 
model more thoroughly in this dissertation.  Also, this disseration only addresses death penalty 
cases, and it would be ideal to add other salient issues other than the death penalty.  It would also 
be ideal to add intra-Court variables such as dissent rates or norms of the bench in each court. 
That would allow me to account for more intra-Court, or “strategic” approach, principles.  If all 
of this could be accomplished, a comprehensive account of state judicial decision-making, one 
that represents the basic principles of the three major theories of judicial behavior, could be 
achieved.     
 Lastly, it would be interesting to examine the influence of the party composition at the 
federal level, and to see if the party composition of the federal level has an impact on the voting 
behavior of the state high court judges.  Testing the influence of the partisan composition of the 
federal level will test the strength of the New Institutionalist model to the fullest, as the potential 
for constitutionally-based appeals through the federal system would be addressed.  Ultimately, 
my research does not account for the possibility that judges on state courts of appeal are 
influenced by potential overrides from judges serving on the federal courts that might ultimately 
hear constitutional challenges.  Overall, adding all of these individual, institutional, and 
environmental factors will increase our understanding of the voting behavior at the state level.  
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Nevertheless, my research is a step to the right direction to the development of the new theories 
in the study of state supreme courts in American politics.  
 
Section 5.7: Discussion of Unresolved Questions 
 
There are many unresolved questions in my dissertation.  For instance, it was unclear 
why the legislative branch does not have statistical significance in explaining judicial voting 
behavior.  One can speculate that the legislative branch has less control over state high judges, 
but it would be fascinating for future scholars to present some kind of empirical testing of the 
role of the legislative branch on judicial decision-making at all levels of government.  Also, it 
would be interesting to add other criminal cases other than those addressing the death penalty 
cases.  Obviously, death penalty is not a litmus test on whether someone is conservative or 
liberal, and it certainly does not represent all the criminal cases.  Ultimately, while state 
legislatures are less relevant than the governors that have the power of appointment, there are 
some states where legislatures are the body with the power to appoint judges.  However, it seems 
as though the fact political ideology is diffused over multiple actors in a legislative body is 
relevant to the null finding on my legislative variables; in this regard, the presence of multiple 
veto points that are capable of scuttling the passage of legislation is also relevant to the 
discussion.   
 
Section 5.8: Future of State Court Decision-Making Scholarship 
 
Judicial scholars argue that the judicial politics field requires more rigorous work to build 
models and theories.  Judicial scholars have “yet to achieve a very complete understanding of the 
role of institutions and context on judicial behavior and processes in terms of theory” (Hall, 
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1997, p. 14).  Unlike other fields in political science, the judicial politics field lacks a rich record 
of datasets, and researchers are building their own datasets gradually as a result (Hall, 1997).  
Hall (1997) argues that “without a systematic data base, many findings in the state judicial 
politics remain anecdotal and descriptive, and more general theories of judicial processes and 
behavior will continue to be elusive” (Hall, 1997, p. 15).  I choose to be hopeful and wish that 
future judicial scholars will contribute to the field of judicial politics through stimulating 
research especially on state courts.   
Therefore, the future of state court scholarship depends on the work of those who believe 
in building and testing models and theories of state judicial decision-making.  This field is worth 
examining because of its relevance for the theories of checks and balances, independent 
behavior, and separation of powers that are illuminated herein.  If certain additional variables 
mentioned in this section are added, a discussion of federalism could also be relevant.  Overall, I 
feel confident that many judicial scholars will choose to apply the aforementioned theories of 
judicial behavior to state courts.  With my research notwithstanding, there is a lot to be 
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